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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, considerable legal scholarship has focused on the 
liabilities of corporate boards of directors. 1 The composition and proce-
dures of corporate boards, and innumerable proposals to reform the 
same, have spawned countless books and articles.2 No doubt recent cor-
I. See, e.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., l THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's 
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Sel/Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 655 (1992); Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Stan-
dard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. I (1989); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's 
Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 
62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983); Alfred F. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for 
NegUgence, 1972 DUKE L.J. 895 (1972); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty o.fCare of Corporate Di-
rectors ond Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945 (1990); Charles Hanson, The ALI Corporate Govern-
ance Project: Of the Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. LA w 
123 7 ( 1986); Peter Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Divers[fication on Corporate Law and Or-
ganization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179 (2001); Harold 
Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Interest Transactions and the 
ALi's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954 (1993); Edward B. Rock & 
Michael L. Wachter, lslandr of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Set/Governing Corpora-
tion, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001 ); Larry D. Soderquist, The Proper Standard for Director 's Neg-
ligence Liability, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 37 (1990). l confess I have contributed my small share to 
the literature treating corporate directors primarily as a target for legal liability. See, e.g., FRANKLIN 
A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW, §§ 4.1-4.4 (2000); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment 
Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287 (1994). 
2. See, e.g., ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 203-10 (2d 
ed. 2001); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.02, 3A.01-3A.05 (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE]; MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 149-85 (I 976); 
Robert W. Hamilton, Cmporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain 
Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349 (I 999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relalionship 
Between Board Composition and Firm Pe1formance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999); Laura Lin, The 
Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898 (I 996); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensalion, and Stock 
Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 ( 1995); ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Direc-
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porate scandals will once again produce the question "Where were the 
directors? " and lead to still more lawsuits against directors , and more 
calls for reform.3 Yet, given the constant interest in, and litany of com-
plaints about, corporate boards, perhaps more scholars should ask why 
corporation laws in the United States, and, indeed, around the world, 
generally call for corporate governance by or under a board of directors. 4 
After all, there are other governance models for a business. 5 
This Article seeks to add to the literature on why boards exist. 
Moreover, it does so by taking a very different approach in searching for 
an answer. Instead of theorizing, this Article examines historical sources 
in order to look at how and why an elected board of directors came to be 
the accepted mode of corporate governance. The story of how and why 
corporate boards arose turns out not only to be interesting in its own 
right, but it shows that the original purpose for having boards was quite 
different from the purposes argued based upon current economic and or-
ganizational theory. This insight, in tum, may help explain the frustrat-
ing dissonance between what corporate law currently expects of boards, 
and what boards, in fact, do. 
This examination of the historical and political origins of the corpo-
rate board of directors will proceed in four parts. To provide a starting 
point against which to address the history of corporate boards, Part II of 
this Article explores the current puzzle presented by the board of direc-
tor 's Guidebook, 49 Bus . LAW. 1243 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman , Reinventing 
the Outside Direclor: An Agenda/or Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991 ); Arthur J. 
Goldberg , Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 29, 1972, at I. 
3. See, e.g., Doug las M . Branson, Enron- When All Systems Fail: Creative Des/ruction or 
Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 V!LL. L. REV. 989, 1014-2 1 (2003) ; Jame s D. Cox, 
Managing and Monitoring Coriflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with independ-
ent Counsel, 48 V!LL. L. REV. 1077, 1093-95 (200 3); Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The 
Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855 (2003); Luca 
Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Gov-
ernance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 911 , 927-32 (2003); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron 
Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Cmporalion: Some Initial Reflec-
tions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1234-35 (2002); Klaus J. Hop!, Modern Company and Capilal Mar-
ket Problems: improving European Corporate Governance After Enron (ECG[ , Working Paper No. 
05(2002, 2002) . 
4. For a discussion of the leading scholarship addressing this subject, see infra text accom-
panyi ng notes 6-7, 15. 
5. See, e.g., REV'D UN!F. P'SH!P ACT§ 401(1) (2001) (prov iding for equa l partner rights in 
the mana geme nt of a partne rship); Uniform Partne rship Act§ 18(e) (1914 ) (providing for govern-
ance of a partnership by all partn ers in the absence of agree ment to the contrary); UN!F. LTD. P'SH!P 
ACT, Prefatory Note (2003) (purpose of the new Uniform Limited Partner ship Act is to provide a 
form of business for peopl e who want strong central management, strongl y entrenched , and passive 
investo rs wi th little con trol). See also infra text accom panying notes 70- 72 (showing that boards 
com monl y do not do much to govern corporatio ns anyway). 
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tors as an institution. The puzzle arises because of a clash between the 
model of the corporate board as the supreme body elected by the share-
holders to ensure governance of the company on the shareholders' be-
half, and the reality of the minor role that corporate boards actually play 
in the governance of most companies. With this background in place, 
Part III of this Article traces the historical roots of corporate boards. This 
will entail a reverse chronological tour all the way back to the antece-
dents of today's corporate board in fourteenth through sixteenth century 
companies of English merchants engaged in foreign trade. In Part IV, 
this Article turns from when and how corporate boards developed, to ad-
dress the underlying concepts and purposes behind the adoption of the 
antecedents of today's corporate boards. This part shows how the ante-
cedents of today's corporate boards found their genesis in the political 
theories and practices of medieval Europe that, although hardly democ-
ratic, often called for the use of collective governance by a body of rep-
resentatives. Finally, this Article concludes in Part V with some thoughts 
as to what this history tells us about the role and purpose of a corporate 
board. Specifically, the historical and political origins of the corporate 
board suggest that the current frustration with corporate boards may 
arise from confusing an institution of political legitimacy with goals of 
business efficiency. 
II. THE CURRENT PUZZLE OF CORPORA TE BOARDS 
A. The Board-Centered Model of Corporate Governance 
American corporation statutes provide, with minor variations in 
language, that a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction 
of its board of directors.6 This board-centered model of corporate gov-
ernance is not only the universal norm in American corporate law, it is 
also the prevailing model of corporate governance around the world.7 
6. See. e.g., MODEL. BUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.01 (2002) ; DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW. § 141 (a). 
7. See, e.g., RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN 
EUROPE AND THE U.S.A. 182-84 (1988) (describing the role of boards of director s in Europe); 
Christopher L. Heftel, Sun,ey, Corporate Governance in Japan: The Position of Shareholders in 
Publicly Held Corporations, 5 U. HAW. L. REV. 135, 138-40, 153-54 (1983) (explaining the Japa-
nese requirement that each stock company have at least three directors); Howard Gensler, Company 
Formation and Securities Listing in the People's Republic of China, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 399, 420-
21 (1995) (discussing the requirements for boards in China). An important caveat to this statement 
comes from the German two-tier board model under which there is both a supervisory board and a 
management board. See Thomas J. Andre, Jr. , Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: 
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Yet, viewed in a literal and narrow manner, to say that a corporation 
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors does 
not say that much. After all, someone must manage a corporation. The 
substance of this model of corporate governance comes from three un-
derlying concepts. These concepts involve the relationship of the direc-
tors to the shareholders, the relationship of the directors to each other, 
and the relationship of the directors to the corporation's executives. 
The first underlying coP..cept of the board-centered model of corpo-
rate governance is that shareholders elect (normally annually) the direc-
tors. 8 To see the significance of this concept, one can compare it with 
other models. Under the partnership law default rule, the owners of the 
firm (the partners), simply by virtue of being owners, manage the part-
nership.9 By contrast, the corporation's owners (the shareholders), by 
virtue of being shareholders, have no right to manage the corporation. '0 
Their only right is to elect directors, and to vote on matters the directors 
submit ( either under compulsion of statute' 1 or voluntarily 12) for share-
holder approval. Another extremely common governance model in part-
nerships, and in other non-corporate forms of business, 13 is for an 
agreement among the owners to specify who shall be the managers of 
the business. 14 Yet another scheme would be management by a self-
A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819, 1823-26 ( 1996). For a discussion 
of how and why the corporate board of directors spread around the world, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, 
The European Origins and Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925 
(2004). 
8. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.03(c); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§ 21 l(b). An impor-
tant exception to the world-wide acceptance of thi s concept is the German invented system of co-
determination , under which employees elect up to half of the corpora tion 's directors. See Klaus J. 
Hop!, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with labor Representation on 
Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338, 1346 (1984). 
9. See, e.g. , REV'D UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 401(£) (1997); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 18(e) (1914). 
I 0. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3. l.3a (2000). 
11. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ l l .04(b) ( 1994) (requiring sha reholder approval for a 
merger); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§ 25l(c) (2001) (same) . 
12. As , for example, when directors submit conflict-of-interest transactions for shareholder 
approval. See, e.g., MODEL B us. CORP. ACT § 8.63(d) (2002) (dealing with the impact of share-
holder approva l in conflict-of-interest transactions); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144(a)(2) (2001) 
(same). 
13. And often attempted in derogation of the board-centered model of governance in corpora-
tions as well. See discussion infi'a Parts II.A. , 11.B.2. 
14. See, e.g. , FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNlNG 239, 245-46 (2d ed. 1995) (dis-
cussing and giving examples of agreements designating managing partners or managers of an LLC). 
The traditional limited partnership encompasses this approach as part of its basic governance model. 
In this model, some owners (general partners) manage and face unlimited liability, while other own -
ers (limited partners) agree to relinqui sh a role in management in exc hange for limited liability. See 
UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT§ 303(a) (2003). 
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perpetuating oligarchy of managers. 15 The corporate scheme of periodic 
elections is obviously different, in theory if not in fact, from contractu-
ally designated or self-perpetuating managers . 
The second concept underlying the board-centered model of corpo-
rate governance is that a group composed of peers acting together makes 
the decisions. Again, the significance of this concept becomes clear if 
one compares it to other governance schemes. Many businesses have 
one person who single-handedly makes at least the ultimate decisions. 16 
By contrast, the historic rule, and still prevailing norm, is that corporate 
boards consist of more than one director. 17 As businesses or other or-
ganizations grow, group decision-making commonly replaces the soli-
tary decision-maker. Nevertheless, this is often a hierarchical group. 18 In 
such a group, all members might have input, and the group often strives 
toward consensus, but, at least as a legal matter, one person has the ulti-
mate power to make the decision. 19 By contrast, the corporate board 
norm is that all directors have an equal vote, and majority rule prevails 
in the event of differences. 20 Another alternative, often employed in con-
junction with hierarchical group decision-making, is to subdivide author-
ity among individuals.21 By contrast, the longstanding corporate Jaw rule 
is that directors lack any authority to act as individual directors ; rather, 
the directors only have authority when they act as a group through board 
meetings.22 
15. Many Dutch corporations follow this scheme (except insofar as qualified by the right of 
employees to object to the labor representatives selected by the board). See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 53 (6th ed. 2004). 
16. This , of course, is the way a sole proprietorship typically operates. 
17. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03 cmt. I (2002) (indicating that before 1969 the 
Model Act required three or more directors ); Edwin J. Bradley , Toward a More Perfect Close Cor-
poration- The Need for More and improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1151 (1966). More 
recentl y, amendment s to corporation statutes have allowed single-person boards. See MODEL Bu s. 
CORP. ACT§ 8.03 (2002) ; CAL. CORP. CODE§ 212(a) ( 1990) (allowing less than three board mem-
bers if the corporation has less than three shareholders). 
18. See VICTOR A. THOMPSON, MODERN ORGANIZATION 190 (2d ed. 1977). 
19. See Alan L. Feld, Separation of Poli1ical Powers: Boundaries or Balance?, 21 GA. L. 
REV. 171, 180 ( 1986). The famous anecdote of President Lincoln and his cabinet provides an illus-
tration. The story goes that Lincoln put a decision to his cabinet, all of whom voted no. Lincoln 
voted aye. Lincoln then announced that the "ayes have it." Id. 
20. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.24(c) (2002). 
2 l. Thi s, in fact, describes the typical corporate management structure below the board level. 
See Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside Directors , 24 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 5, 9-J I (1989). 
22. See Baldwin v. Canfield, I N.W. 261 , 270 (Minn. 1879). A minor variation on this rule 
exist s under common corporate statutes which allow board action through unanimous written con-
sent. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.21 (2002). Also, directors might be allowed to act through 
committees . See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.25 (2002). 
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The third concept embedded in the board-centered model of corpo-
rate governance is that the board has the ultimate responsibility for se-
lecting and supervising the corporation's senior executives (especially its 
chief executive officer). Actually, corporation statutes often allow, and a 
rare corporation's bylaws might provide , for shareholder election of the 
corporation's president or other senior officers. 23 Nevertheless, the 
overwhelming practice is for the board to appoint the chief executive of-
ficer and other senior corporate officials. 24 Moreover, courts have held 
that arrangements, which deprive boards of the ultimate power to control 
officers or other individuals in managing the corporation, violate the 
statutory provision commanding that corporations be managed by or un-
der the direction of the board.25 
B. Rationalizations for the Board-Centered Model of Corporate 
Governance 
Most literature dealing with the corporate board of directors takes 
the existence of this institution as a given. 26 Nevertheless, a number of 
writers have suggested various rationales for this governance structure. 
1. The Need for Central Management 
A simple-minded rationale often expressed for the board-centered 
model of corporate governance is that businesses with numerous owners 
need "central management." 27 The basic notion is that it is impractical to 
have numerous owners-especially if they own freely tradable inter-
ests-constantly meet together to make decisions for the firm. This cer-
tainly explains why firms with numerous owners might not wish to fol-
low the partnership law default rule under which all owners participat e 
in managing the firm. Indeed, writers typically list the desirability of 
23. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§ 142(b) (2001) (providing that officers may be appointed by 
the board or as provided in the bylaws). But see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.40(b) (2002) (the 
board appoints officers ; albe it officers can appoint other officers if authorized by the board or by-
laws). 
24. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 162-63 . 
25. See Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co. , 260 P.2d 823, 823, 830-33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App . 1953); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Thea tres Co. , 77 N.E.2d 633 , 635 (N.Y. 
1948). See also Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214 (De l. 1996) (acknowledging the rule, but 
not finding an impermissible delegation). An obvious excep tion to this exists if the statute allows a 
specific sort of arrang ement which deprives the board of authority. 
26 . See generally supra notes 1-3. But see Robert A. Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a 
Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 696 (1960) (quest ioning the 
need for a board of directors in all corporations). 
27. See ROBERT c. CLARK, CORPORA TE LA w § 1.2.4 ( 1986). 
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central management as one reason why persons establishing a business 
anticipated to have numerous owners might prefer to operate through a 
corporation rather than a partnership. 28 Yet, this rationale fails to justify 
most of the concepts that underlie the board-centered model of corporate 
governance. 
The need for central management fails to explain why shareholders 
should annually elect the board. As stated above, 29 agreements govern-
ing many non-corporate business organizations with numerous owners 
specify who will be in charge of the business, rather than providing for 
periodic elected terms. Alternately, a self-perpetuating oligarchy would 
provide for central management. More fundamentally, the need for cen-
tral management does not explain why this management should take the 
form of a group acting together as peers. A sole decision-maker would 
provide central management. More realistically in a large business, why 
not provide for decision-making through a hierarchy leading to a chief 
executive officer? 
2. Group Decision-making 
A recent article by Stephen Bainbridge 30 moves beyond the need 
for central management in asking why corporate law calls for a board, 
rather than just a chief executive officer, to be at the apex of the corpora-
tion's management. He points to behavioral psychology studies which 
suggest that groups, such as corporate boards, often produce better deci-
sions than can single individuals when it comes to matters of judgment. 31 
Presumably, it was not Professor Bainbridge's intent to justify all 
aspects of the board-centered model of corporate governance in pointing 
to better decisions from groups versus individuals. For example, he does 
not explain why shareholders annually should elect the group (as op-
posed to some agreed designation of the managing group or the use of a 
self-perpetuating oligarchy). Even as to the central thesis, however, the 
question remains whether the evidence Professor Bainbridge cites to is 
sufficient to establish that peer group decision-making, as contemplated 
by the board-centered model of corporate governance, is superior to hi-
erarchical group decision-making. In other words, while the multiple in-
28. See Thomas L. Hazen, The Decision to Incorporate, 58 NEB. L. REV. 627, 628 (1979). 
29. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14. 
30. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 
55 VAND. L. REV. I (2002). 
31. The notion that groups might reach better decisions than individuals is hardly new or 
unique to corporate law scholarship. Proponents of the jury system often point to this rationale. See 
Michael J. Saks, Book Review: Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693, 706-07 (1986) (reviewing Val-
erie P. Hans & Neil Widmar'sJudging the Jury (1986)). 
2004] ORIGINS OF THE CORPORATE BOARD 97 
put found in groups often leads to superior decisions than made by a sin-
gle individual, it is less clear from experimental studies of group deci-
sion-making whether this requires the group to act as peers, with 
disagreements ultimately resolved by majority rule, rather than as a 
"cabinet" to a single person who has the final say. This is not an abstract 
quibble, since most observers of the large corporation assert that the 
predominant decision-making mode, in reality, is hierarchical group de-
cision-making. 32 Indeed, even the sort of fundamental strategic decisions 
normally thought of as within the board's purview , in fact, typically are 
made by a group consisting of the chief executive officer and the senior 
executives in charge of the major divisions or responsible for key func-
tions.33 To the extent directors, as such, provide input for such decisions, 
this commonly occurs through informal conversations with a few more 
influential members of the board, rather than at a board meeting. 34 Later, 
this Article shall address why, in a publicly held corporation, hierarchi-
cal group decision-making tends to replace peer group decision-making 
regardless of existence of a corporate board- thereby rendering this at-
tempt to justify boards rather theoretical. 35 
3. Representation of Corporate Constituents and Mediating 
Claims to Distributions 
Yet a different explanation for the use of corporate boards focuses 
on the need to mediate the competing claims of those who have an inter-
est in distributions from the corporation. Proponents of this explanation 
vary in terms of which claimants the board exists to mediate between , 
and whether the need for a board arises from the desirability of the vari-
ous claimants having representation on the decision -making body, or the 
need for a decision-making body to be independent from the various 
claimants. 
Probably the most traditional variation of this rationale suggests 
that boards exist so that large shareholders 36 can elect themselves or their 
nominees as directors in order to protect their interests in distributions. 
Empirical support for this variation purportedly arises out of a recent 
32. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 140-41. 
33. See Interview with John Scriven, former General Counsel of The Dow Chemical Corpora-
tion (Oct. 8, 2002). 
34. See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: 
Time/or Reality, 39 Bus . LAW. 1477, 1483 (1984). 
3 5. See infra text accompanying notes 68-79. 
36. A shareholder with only a small percentage of the outstanding stock lacks the power, even 
with techniques such as cumulative voting, to elect oneself or one's nominee to a corporate board. 
See GEVURTZ, supra note I, at § 5.2.1 a. 
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study conducted by Morten Bennedsen of Denmark. 37 Professor Benned-
sen attempted to look at the motives for using boards of directors by 
studying a large sample of Danish firms formed as anpartsselskaber (an 
"AN"). The Danes modeled this business form on the German GmbH. 38 
Danish law does not require ANs to possess a board of directors, but, 
nevertheless, Professor Bennedsen's study of such firms found that a lit-
tle less than one-fifth of his sample used a board governance structure, 
including more than half of the firms with three to five owners, and two-
thirds of the firms with more than five owners. Based upon highly indi-
rect statistical evidence, 39 Professor Bennedsen argues that a motive for 
using boards in the closely held companies he studied was to protect 
non-controlling shareholders from exploitation by controlling sharehold-
ers, particularly in regard to distributions from the company. 
It is impossible to assess Professor Bennedsen's study without 
much more information about the specific control arrangements in the 
firms he studied. It is true that boards provide a means by which non-
controlling owners might obtain some say in firm management, includ-
ing regarding corporate distributions. Nevertheless, the traditional wis-
dom from the experience of closely held corporations in the United 
States is that the board-centered model of corporate governance is far 
more likely to allow controlling shareholders to exploit non-controlling 
shareholders, than are other modes of management, such as provided by 
the partnership default rules, or might be found in a well-drafted share-
holders agreement. 4° Consider , for example, the impact of the underlying 
concept of the board-centered model of corporate governance that the 
shareholders periodically elect the directors. This has been a recipe for 
controlling shareholders to bounce non-controlling shareholders off of 
the board of closely held corporations whenever controlling shareholders 
feel like squeezing non-controlling shareholders out of any say in corpo-
37. Morten Bennedsen , Why Do Firms Have Boards ? (SSRN, Working Paper available on the 
SSRN database, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstra ct=303680. 
38. Id at 5 n.2. "GmbH" is short for Gesellschaft mil beschriinkter Hajiung, which means 
company with limited liability. Henry P. De Vries & Friedrich K. Juenger, limited Lia bility Con-
tract: The GmbH, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 867 (1964). The basic idea is to allow limited liability, 
but without all the requirements imposed on pub licly held corporations. See id at 867-68. 
39. Professor Bennedsen draws inferences regarding the probable motives for use of boards 
from certain statistical correlations (as, for example, the relationship between the dispersion of stock 
and the use ofa board). The validity of these inferences is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
40. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MrNORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS: PROTECTING MINORITY RJGHTS IN SQUEEZE-OUTS AND OTHER INTRACORPORATE 
CONFLICTS § 2.10 (2d ed. 1996). 
2004) ORIGINS OF THE CORPORA TE BOARD 99 
rate govemance. 41 Of course, there are mechanisms, to which all parties 
can agree before any dissension , for ensuring non-controlling sharehold-
ers remain on the board.42 By comparison, however , even without spe-
cial preplanning, partnership law ensures all owners a say in manage-
ment , since (barring other agreement) partners, simply by virtue of being 
partners, are entitled to participate in managing a partnership. 43 More-
over, even if non-controlling shareholders remain on the board, the un-
derlying concept that corporate boards act by majority rule (as opposed 
to following an advance agreement, as in a partnership contract) serves 
to allow the majority shareholders in a closely held corporation to gain 
disproportionate distributions at the expense of non-controlling share-
holders.44 Again, there are agreements that shareholders can make before 
dissension, through which minority shareholde rs can protect their rights 
to distributions from the corporation. 45 Yet, such agreements act in dero-
gation of the concept that the board, acting through majority rule, man-
ages the corporation. Indeed, in earlier years , courts often struck down 
such agreements for this reason.46 By contrast , the laws governing part-
nerships and other non-corporate business forms, not only contemplate, 
but encourage , agreements with respect to distributions and the like.47 
A broader variation of this sort of rationale asserts that boards exist 
to mediate claims not just among shareholders, but also between share-
holders and other corporate constituencies, such as managers, other em-
ployees, creditors, and perhaps even the community at large. While 
strains of this notion go back in the United States at least to the famous 
Berle-Dodd debate in the pages of the Harvard Law Review,48 a recent 
41. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1976) (holding 
the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder). 
42. See GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 477-87. 
43. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
44. See. e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co ., 328 N.E.2d 505, 520 (Mass. 1975) (but hold-
ing the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder). 
45. See GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 477-87 . 
46. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 236 (N.Y. 1934). Corporat e law now gen-
erally allows such agreements . 
47. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-outs and Freeze-outs in Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 504-05, 508-09 (1995). This discussion suggests that maj ority or con-
trolling shareholder s might actually prefer board governance . Yet, if the majori ty or controlling 
shareholders desire to cut off the minority from either d istributions or a voice in running the busi-
ness, a system under which owners , by majority vote, dictate distributions and elect senior officers 
to run the corporation (as in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass . 
1976)) would accomplish the majority or controlling shareholders' objective even without a board. 
48. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1365 (l 932). 
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article by Lynn Stout49 attempts to find empirical evidence that share-
holders grant power to the board for this reason. In this modem iteration , 
the argument is that various groups-equity investors, lenders, manag-
ers, other employees , and the like-all make contributions necessary to 
corporate revenues, and all expect some distribution from those reve-
nues. Indeterminacy in the ultimate value of all these contributions to-
ward producing revenue makes it extraordinarily difficult to come up 
with ex ante contracts that will adequately compensate, but not over-
compensate, each claimant. This, in tum, suggests the need for a mediat-
ing body with the power to make ex post decisions about distributions. 
Professor Stout argues that shareholder acquiescence in devices, such as 
poison pills, that insulate boards from shareholder control evidence that 
shareholders themselves have concluded that boards exist for this pur-
pose. 
The question of whether directors should have either a duty or a 
right to look out for the interests of contributors to the corporate enter-
prise other than the shareholders ( except insofar as doing so advances 
the interests of the shareholders) has been a subject of considerable legal 
and economic policy debate.50 This article is not the occasion to replay 
the various arguments.51 For present purposes, it is sufficient to ask 
whether the rationale that the board exists in order to mediate between 
corporate constituents explains all of the attributes of the board-centered 
model of corporate governance. It would if boards were composed of 
representatives of the various constituents. In that event, one could un-
derstand why there should be an elected group at the apex of corporate 
management. Hence, this rationale seems to explain the existence of the 
supervisory board with some representatives elected by the shareholders 
and other representatives elected by the workers under the German sys-
tem of co-determination. 52 Yet, for the United States, and most of the 
world, the board-centered model of corporate governance assumes a 
board elected by the shareholders. 53 If the board is not to have elected 
representatives of each of the constituencies, what is the point of having 
49. Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors 
in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667 (2003). 
50. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); ABA 
Commi ttee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus . 
LAW. 2253 (1990); Morey W. McDaniel , Stockholders and Stakeholders, 2 1 STETSON L. REV. 121 
(1991). 
51. For the author's view, see GEVURTZ, supra note I, at§ 4.1.5. 
52. See, e.g., Hopt, supra note 8, at 1343-44. 
53. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8. 
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a board? Professor Stout's answer is to view the board as an independ-
ent, rather than a representative, body, perhaps in the nature of a neutral 
arbiter. Still, the norm that shareholders elect the directors seems incon-
sistent with this rationale. After an, it is difficult to imagine that various 
corporate constituencies would have designed a system in which one 
body of claimants has the legal right to select whomever it desires to act 
as arbiter of distributions between the claimants. 54 
4. Monitoring of Management 
The final rationale for the board-centered model of corporate gov-
ernance represents the prevailing view. This rationale is that boards 
elected by shareholders exist as a necessary tool to monitor corporate 
management. 55 Typically, this view starts with the assumption that cor-
porate hierarchy exists to gain the advantage of team production, while 
minimizing agency costs (shirking and disloyalty) by having higher-
level agents monitor lower-level agents.56 The problem becomes, how-
ever, who monitors the highest level monitors. The traditional econom-
ics answer is that the shareholders, as the residual claimants, have the 
best incentives to monitor the highest-level agents.57 This answer, how-
ever, faces a practical difficulty in the publicly held corporation, since 
there are too many scattered shareholders to allow for efficient monitor-
ing directly by the shareholders. This, in tum, leads to the argument that 
the corporate board, elected by the shareholders, provides a solution to 
the practical difficulty of shareholders monitoring on their own behalf.58 
54. Professor Stout points out that collective action problems effectively blunt shareho lder 
contro l over the composition of the board in public corporations. Instead, as discussed below, man-
agement traditionally has had control over the proxy machinery and chosen the directors. See infra 
text accompanying notes 63-66. Yet, this still does not show that boards can act as independent arbi-
ters; even if boards in publi c corporation s may be more likely to favor senior management as op-
posed to the shareholders. Moreover , the fortuitous happenstanc e that collective action problem s 
undercut the norm of shareholder se lection of directors applies only to public corporations without a 
controlling shareholder ( or controlling shareholder group). Hence , Professor Stout fails to explain 
the existence of boards in corpo rations other than publicly held corporations without controlling 
shareholder(s). More significantly , the fact that controlling shareholders dictate the composition of 
the boards in most corpora tion s fundamentally undercuts Professor Stout 's rationalization for boards 
even in publi c compa nies, since it shows that firms can and do overcome the ex ante contracting 
problems between different contributors without an independent mediatin g body. 
55. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPO RATE GOVERNANCE , supra note 2, at§ 3.02; EISENBERG, 
supra note 2, at 169-70. 
56. See Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 5-7. 
57. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production , Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 782-83 (1972). 
58. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. 
&ECON.301,3 11 ( 1983). 
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The monitoring rationale provides an elegant answer to why the 
shareholders should elect the board and why the board should appoint 
the senior executives. Interestingly, however, the rationale does not ex-
plain the need for a board, so long as the shareholders elect whoever 
stands at the apex of corporate management. In other words, one might 
achieve the same monitoring effect by having the shareholders elect the 
corporation 's chief executive officer. Yet, there is an even more funda-
mental problem with the monitoring of management rationale for the 
board-centered model of corporate governance. The monitoring rationale 
rests upon a rather curious assumption. The assumption is that share-
holders, who are too numerous and disengaged to monitor management 
on their own behalf, will become sufficiently engaged and organized to 
select vigilant directors to perform the monitoring for the shareholders. 
C. The Board-Centered Model Of Corporate Governance Meets 
Reality 
The reality of corporate governance differs in subtle, but important, 
ways from a model that posits that shareholders select directors, who se-
lect and supervise senior officers, who, in tum, carry out the board's 
will. The nature of this difference depends upon whether one is dealing 
with a corporation with very few shareholders (a closely held corpora-
tion) or a corporation with very many shareholders (a publicly held cor-
poration). 
1. Closely Held Corporations 
In closely held corporations, reality diverges from the board-
centered model of corporate governance because the shareholders, direc-
tors and officers are the same people.59 In other words, instead of having 
a large group of passive shareholders elect directors (who may or may 
not be shareholders) to manage the company, in a corporation with few 
shareholders, all or most of those shareholders will elect themselves as 
the directors of the company . Similarly, instead of having the board se-
lect officers who may or may not be directors and shareholders, in the 
closely held corporation, the shareholder-directors typically also will se-
lect themselves to be the officers. Under these circumstances, the share-
holders often simply view themselves as running the business as own-
ers-much as partners operate. As a result, having a board serves little 
evident purpose. 
59. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT 8. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON' S CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS AND LLC S § l.9 (rev. 3d ed. 2004). 
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The reaction of corporate law to the divergence between the board-
centered model of corporate governance and the realities of practice in 
the closely held corporation increasingly has been to give up on any at-
tempt to preserve the board-centered model of corporate governance as 
anything other than a default rule. This is most evident in statutes that 
allow shareholders in close corporations to dispense with the board. 60 
Even without dispensing with the board altogether, modern corporation 
statutes commonly allow shareholders to make agreements which dictate 
who will be directors and what decisions the directors shall make.61 
2. Publicly Held Corporations 
The divergence between the board-centered model of corporate 
governance and reality in a publicly held corporation does not involve 
the melding of shareholders, directors and officers into the same few 
people, but, instead, involves the flow of power between these three 
groups. Specifically, the board-centered model of corporate governance 
perceives power to flow from shareholders, who decide who will be the 
directors, to the directors, who select the corporate officers and set pol-
icy, to the officers. In large measure, the reality in the publicly held cor-
poration has been almost the reverse. The officers, particularly the chief 
executive officer , commonly decide who will be the directors and what 
policies the corporation will pursue.62 To understand why this inversion 
has taken place, we need to examine the incentives which impact deci-
sion-making at the shareholder level and at the director level. 
Shareholders in the publicly held corporation typically are "ration-
ally apathetic"; in other words, the rational shareholder in a publicly held 
corporation normally will conclude that it is not worthwhile to spend 
much time or effort worrying about control over the corporation. 63 After 
all, the cost of trying to change corporate management is quite high-
since the dissatisfied shareholder must seek support from numerous scat-
tered other shareholders-while the rewards are relatively low, since the 
other shareholders will reap most of the gains. In economics lingo, there 
is a huge "free rider" problem. Of course, one might respond that the 
same problem exists when dealing with federal, state and local govern-
ment elections. A significant difference, however, exists between the op-
60. See MODEL Bus. CORP . ACT§ 7.32(a)( 1) (2002) ; DEL. GEN. CORP. L AW § 351 (200 I). 
61. See MODEL Bus. CO RP. ACT§ 7.32(a)(3) (2002); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§§ 2 1 S(c) (vali-
dating agreements regarding who shareholder s will vo te for as direct ors). 350 (validating agree-
ments dictatin g actions of the board ofa statutory close corporation). 
62. See THOMAS L. H AZEN & F. HODGE O'NEAL , CORPORATIONS§ 9.2 ( 1997). 
63. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 15, at 560. 
104 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 :89 
tions open to dissatisfied shareholders and the options open to dissatis-
fied citizens. The shareholder who is displeased with management in a 
publicly held corporation can quickly and easily sell his or her shares. 
This self-help remedy of selling out is often referred to as following the 
"Wall Street rule." It is much less practical for the dissatisfied citizen to 
pack up and move out of the jurisdiction. 
Compounding the rational apathy phenomenon is the incumbent di-
rectors' control over the corporate proxy machinery . Almost invariably , 
the corporation will pay for the incumbent directors' (or their nominees') 
solicitation of proxies. 64 This is certainly the case if the election is un-
contested, and normally is the case even in a contested election. By con-
trast, challengers will need to foot their own solicitation expenses unless 
(at the very least) they win.65 This imbalance creates a significant finan-
cial disincentive for anyone to challenge the incumbent board. The end 
result is that, unlike federal, state and local government elections, elec-
tions of corporate directors rarely are contested. 66 
The observation that shareholders in publicly held corporations do 
not really control the corporation by selecting the directors is known as 
the "Berle-Means thesis" after the two professors who wrote a book in 
1932 that recognized this phenomenon. 67 The discussion so far, how-
ever, only explains why shareholders do not control the composition of 
the board. It does not explain why the officers do have such control, nor 
have we explained why officers, rather than directors, control corporate 
decisions. 
To understand why officers, rather than directors, control the public 
corporation , it is useful to divide directors into two types: "inside" direc-
tors and "outside" directors. "Inside" directors refers to directors who 
also work full time for the corporation, in other words, directors who are 
also officers. "Outside" directors refers to directors who are not full time 
employees of the corporation. 
A number of practical constraints traditionally have operated to 
curb the control that outside directors can exercise over the corporation. 
Some of these constraints are obvious. For example, outside directors 
have limited time to devote to the corporation. After all, these are indi-
64. See GEVURTZ, supra note I at§ 3.J.3(b)(3). 
65. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. , 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 
1955). 
66. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
336 (8th ed. 2000) (citing SEC and Georgeson & Co. data). 
67. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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viduals who, by definition, might have full time employment somewhere 
else. 68 Closely related to the lack of time is the quality of information 
available to the outside directors in making corporate decisions. As a 
practical matter, the outside directors must rely on information presented 
to them by the corporation's officers when making decisions.69 True, di-
rectors have a legal right to inspect corporate records. 70 Yet, time con-
straints generally render this right more theoretical than actual. Given 
these constraints of time and information, the board can hardly initiate 
much of any corporate strategy or decisions. Instead, the board's role 
largely falls to approval of such strategies and decisions as officers bring 
before the board.71 Even in the context of approving strategies and deci-
sions made by the corporation 's officers, however, the board's effective 
control tends to be marginal. This is so not only because most corporate 
decisions never come before the board, but also because a number of 
factors make it a rare case in which a board will veto an action proposed 
by the officers. A couple of these factors we have just seen: Lack of time 
and lack of independent information make it difficult for outside direc-
tors to second guess the corporation's officers. In addition, there are 
various biases that work against the outside directors second-guessing 
the corporation's officers. For example, outside directors might have re-
lationships with the corporation or its officers that would make outside 
directors think twice about challenging the officers.72 Most fundamen-
tally, however, inside directors, and particularly the chief executive offi-
cer, have controlled the corporate proxy machinery and decided who sat 
on the board. 73 This may simply be the consequence of the normal ten-
dency of those with the greater stake-in this event, the insiders whose 
jobs are on the line-to be more assertive in exercising control over the 
key levers of power. At any event, if the officers, especially the chief ex-
68. Among the sorts of individuals who commonly serve as outside directors on corporate 
boards are chief executive officers of other companies, bankers and lawye rs. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN 
& JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES 131 (8th ed. 2002). Even academics and former government officials who sometimes sit 
on boards have other things to do . 
69. See EISENBERG, supra note 66, at 204 . 
70. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 16.05(a) (2002). 
71. See Manning, supra note 34, at 1483-84 . 
72. The board of directors at Enron provided a good illustration of this problem. See Gordon, 
supra note 3, at 1241-42. 
73. See James D. Westphal & Edward J . Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, 
Demographic Similarity. and New Director Selection, 40 ADM IN. SCI. Q. 60, 78 ( 1995) (de scribing 
how powerful boards tend to appoint new directors who are demographically similar to them). 
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ecutive officer, pick directors, the normal human instinct will be to se-
lect directors who are likely to defer to the officers. 74 
What about the inside directors? Since they work full time for the 
corporation , presumably they do not face the same time or information 
constraints as the outside directors. Yet, in evaluating the ability of the 
inside directors to manage the corporation in their role as directors, we 
must take cognizance of the two inconsistent realms in which the inside 
directors operate. As board members, the inside directors operate in what 
is supposed to be a collegial decision-making process among equals, 
with differences resolved, if necessary, by majority vote.75 As officers, 
however, the inside directors operate in a hierarchical setting in which 
the chief executive officer has the last word. Moreover, the chief execu-
tive officer traditionally has dictated the junior officers' prospects for re-
tention and promotion. 76 Ultimately, it is probably too much to expect 
that directors who are subordinate to the chief executive officer all but a 
few days per year are suddenly going to switch gears and second guess 
the chief executive officer at the board meeting. Instead, while subordi-
nate officers of the corporation may have a significant voice in develop-
ing policy-i ndeed, effective chief executive officers often work by 
seeking consensus, 77 and much corporate policy originates within the 
various divisions 78- the input of inside directors comes in their role as 
officers rather than co-equal board members. 79 
All told, the result has been to reduce the board of directors to an 
institution which, despite its formal role as the supreme governing body 
of the corporation, in fact, does very little. 80 This dissonance between the 
74. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY I08 ( l 97 l ). 
75. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
76. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 
1491-92 ( 1989). 
77. See lnte1view with John Scriven, supra note 33. 
78. This is particularly the case in the "M-form" management stnictur c. See Oliver E. Wil-
liamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 35 1, 
366 (1983). 
79. See MACE, supra note 74, at l 19-20. 
80. See, e.g., MONKS & M!NOW, supra note 2, at 209 ('The primary conclusion of this chapter 
is that America's boards of directors have, more often than not, failed to protect shareholders' inter-
ests.''); Rita Kosnik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 163, 166-67 (1987) (modern board is a "co-opted appendage institution"); Myles L. 
Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293 (1979) (study reaf-
finned results of earlier study as to director passivity) ; MACE, supra note 74, at l 07 (sn1dy finding 
that directors rarely challenged or monitored CEO performance, but often served as little more than 
"attractive ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree") ; ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS 
LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 143 (1961) ("the board of directors in the typical large 
corporation does not actively exercise an important part in the leadership function"). 
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expected role for the board, and the realities of corporate governance, 
appears to be inherent in the nature of the institution. One piece of evi-
dence for this conclusion comes from the fact that complaints about di-
rector inaction go back through the history of corporate boards, appear-
ing in sources ranging from classic articles of legal scholarship,81 to 
nineteenth century literature.82 Nor are such complaints limited to boards 
in the United States. 83 Moreover, despite claims of improvement s in cor-
porate board governance, recent scandals again have produced com-
plaints about passive boards. 84 Of course, the fact that large corporations 
have prospered, and have contributed to modem economic prosperity, 
suggests that there must be something right about the management struc-
ture of corporations-notwithstanding complaints arising from periodic 
corporate meltdowns. Still, it is difficult to read the work of economic 
historians without coming to the conclusion that the managerial devel-
opments which made corporations work are those- like the development 
of the U-form and M-form organizational structure- that occurred be-
low the level of the board of directors .85 
8 l. See, e.g., William 0 . Dougla s, Directors Who Do Not Direc1, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 
(1934) (pointing out in 1934 that a popu lar theme had become that director s should assume the re-
spon sibility of directin g). 
82. See, e.g., ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WAY WE LIVE Now 298-309 ( 1875) ("Melmotte [the 
chief exec utive officer of the compan y, and perpetrator of a fraudulent promotion,] wou ld speak a 
few slow words ... always ind icative of triumph , and then everybod y would agree to everythin g, 
somebody would sign something , and the board ... would be over"). 
83. See Corpora/e Governance in Japan : A Report by Oxford Analy tica, in MONKS & 
MINOW, supra note 2, at 267 (explaining that in Japan , formal authorit y is held by the company 
president and the board of directors, but board meetings are infrequent and decisions are rubber 
stamped; rea l autho rity is held by the president and the operating committee compo sed of the pre si-
dent's immed iate subordinates); id at 292 (explaining that the president director-genera l (PDG) of 
French companies wields almo st unchecked control over the enterprise without the counter power of 
the board, whose composition and agenda the PDG contro ls; indeed, it is regarded as "'b ad man-
ners ' for the board to vote on a manageme nt decision"); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to 
Separating Ownership fro m Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 568 (2000 ) (not ing that 
Germa n corporate supervisory board s meet infrequentl y and their informational base has been 
weak). 
84. See, e.g., The Way We Govern Now, ECONOMIST, Jan . 11, 2003 , at 59 (discussing poor 
board gove rnance in light of corpora te scandals involving Enron); Michae l C. Jensen & Josep h 
Fuller , What's a Director To Do?, (Oct. 2003), at http :// ssm.com/AB STRACT=357722 ("The re-
cent wave of corpora te scandals provides continuing evidence that boards have fai led to fulfill their 
role as the top- level corpo rate contro l mechanism"); Gordon, supra note 3, at 1241-42 (noting that 
Enron's board was a "sple ndid board on paper," but its failure revea ls a certain weakness wi th the 
board as a governance mechanism). 
85. See RICHARD S. TEDLOW, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 13-24 , 
56-60 ( 199 1). While the univers al adoption of board governance for public corporat ions makes it 
difficult to perform an empirical study on the impact of procee ding with out a boa rd, vario us recent 
studies attempt to assess the impact of board composition and other corpora te governance practices 
on corpora te perfonna nce. Many of the results have been inconclusive. See Hamilt on, supra note 2, 
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III. THE HISTORICAL ROOT S OF CORPORA TE BOARD S 
Given the dissonance between the norm that corporations are sup-
posed to be managed by, or under the direction of, an elected board, and 
the realities of corporate governance , it is fair to ask when and how the 
norm of board governance developed. With the readers' indulgence, this 
section will not address this subject by using the traditional forward nar-
rative of a history book. Instead, it will trace the roots of corporate 
boards in the manner in which the researcher discovers such things-
which is to begin with the more recent and work one's way backwards in 
time until one cannot find earlier examples of the use of corporate 
boards. In other words, we will follow the method of an archeological 
dig. 
A. Ameri can Corporate Legislation 
The norm that the ultimate power over corporate management re-
sides in an elected board has always existed in American corporation 
statutes. The law commonly considered to be the first general incorpora-
tion statute, New York 's 1811 act, 86 provided that "the stock, property 
and concerns of such company shall be managed and conducted by trus-
tees, who, except those for the first year, shall be elected at such time 
and place as shall be directed by the by laws of the said company .... "87 
Of course, current corporate statutes typically refer to "directors ," rather 
than "trustees," 88 attempt to recognize reality by calling for corporate 
at 364-73 (studies have not produced consis tent posit ive results from cha nges in corpora te gove rn-
ance , such as increased use of independen t dire ctors); Bhaga t & Black, supra note 2, at 945 (review-
ing over 100 studi es and findin g no convincin g ev idence that independent director s improve firm 
performance). Studies in les s developed economie s suggest perhaps a greater impact. See Mark Mo-
bius, Issues in Global Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ASIA-PACIFIC 
CRITIQUE 47-4 8 (Low Chee Keong ed ., 2002) (explaining that recent studies in emerg ing markets 
show better stock performance of companie s with so -ca lled better corporate gov ernance, includ ing 
more independ ent boards). Neverthele ss, it is diffi cult to say how much of this resu lt comes from 
having a board versus other so-called good corporate governa nce practices, how much of improved 
market returns reflect a current desire by inves tors for stock of companies with so- called be tter cor-
porate gove rnance practices, and how much reflect actual improved per formance by such corpo ra-
tion s. 
86. Before New York 's statute , a coupl e of states had enacted narrow corporations laws ad-
dressi ng turnpikes or the like. See HARRY c. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSJNESS ENTERPRISES § 12 (3d ed . 1983). For the most part, how-
ever, prior to this time , corporation s came into ex istence by special legislat ion, which granted char-
ters to individua l corpora tions. See GEVURTZ, supra note 1, at§ 1.1.3 a. 
87. 18 11 N.Y. Laws LXVII. 
88. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.01 (2002); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§ 14l(a) (200 1). 
Some types of corp orations, such as mun1al associat ions, however, often still use the term trustee. 
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.6834 (Wes t 2002). 
2004] ORJGINS OF THE CORPORATE BOARD 109 
management "by or under the direction of' the board, rather than "by" 
the board,89 and specify annual election by shareholders, rather than 
leave this to the bylaws. 90 Still, New York's statute shows that the basic 
norm of corporate board governance existed from the beginning of gen-
eral incorporation laws. 
The New York legislature was not being particularly creative in 
providing for board governance in 1811. In fact, this provision seems 
simply to have codified the common governance pattern established un-
der the individual legislatively granted charters through which corpora-
tions had previously come into existence.91 Take, for example, the 1791 
charter of the Bank of the United States ( often known as the first Bank 
of the United States92). This charter provided for a board of twenty-five 
directors to be elected annually by the shareholders. 93 The bank's board, 
in tum, under the charter, annually appointed one of its members to be 
the bank's president, and could appoint such other officers as the board 
deemed necessary.94 This governance structure was not unique to bank-
ing. As an illustration, look at The Society for Establishing Useful 
Manufactures, which received its charter from the New Jersey legislature 
in 1791. Alexander Hamilton (who also had a hand in the formation of 
the first Bank of the United States the same year) formed this nobly 
named corporation "to produce paper, sail linens, women's shoes, brass 
and ironware, carpets, and print cloth." The affairs of this corporation 
were under the management of thirteen directors elected by the share-
holders. Interestingly enough, the collapse of this corporation provides 
an early American example of the failure of outside directors to monitor 
management. 95 
89. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.0l(b) (2002); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 14l(a) 
(200 l ). The purpose of the "under the direction of' language is to make it clear that the statute does 
not command the board to engage in day-to-day running of the corporation . See MODEL Bus. CORP. 
ACT§ 8.0l(b) cmt. (2002). 
90. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2002); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 21 l(b) 
(2001). 
91. This pattern of governance continued to be found in the special charters granted corpora-
tions even after general incorporation laws first became available. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL & 
SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 121 (l 832). 
92. The charter of the first Bank of the United States expired in 1811. A subsequent charter 
created the second Bank of the United States in 1816. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANK 
REGULATION§ 1.3 (1999). 
93. Bank Act, ch. 10, § 4 (l 791). 
94. Id. §§ 4, 6. 
95. See STANLEY C. VANCE, CORPORA TE LEADERSHIP: BOARDS, DIRECTORS, AND STRATEGY 
3-5 (1983). 
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B. English Antecedents 
1. The Bank of England 
Not surprisingly, the use of boards of directors by the early Ameri-
can corporations finds its apparent roots in similar provisions of English 
corporate charters. The 1694 charter of the Bank of England provides 
one of the clearest examples of English influence on American practice. 
The Bank of England's 1694 charter provided for a board of twenty-four 
directors. 96 Indeed, this charter seems to have pioneered the term "direc-
tor. "97 A "court of proprietors" (what we would now refer to as a share-
holders meeting) annually elected the Bank of England's directors.98 
Several facts show the influence of this charter on American practice. 
An obvious fact is the borrowing of the term "director." Another fact is 
the similarity in the size of the Bank of England's twenty-four-person 
board and the first Bank of the United States' twenty-five-person board 
(which appears simply to have added one to the size of the English 
bank's board in order to avoid tie votes). Finally, in a provision which 
demonstrates influence because of its unusual nature, both the Bank of 
England and the first Bank of the United States imposed term limits on 
directors: The charter of the Bank of England prevented one-third of the 
directors of the bank from seeking reelection, 99 while the charter of the 
First Bank of the United States prevented one-quarter of the directors 
from seeking reelection. 100 
In one important respect, however, American charters , including 
that of the first Bank of the United States, typically differed from the 
governance structure used by the Bank of England. Unlike the common 
American practice as embodied in the charter of the first Bank of the 
United States, the charter of the Bank of England provided for election 
of the bank's president by the court of proprietors , instead of appoint-
96. See Cyril O' Donnell, Origins of the Cmpo rate Executive, 26 BULL. Bus. HIST. Soc'y 55, 
61 (1952). 
97. See, e.g., RONALD RALPH FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN 
COMPANY LAW 2 1 (1923). While the 1618 charter of the Africa Company called for a board of 
twelve "d irectors," this terminology for board members did not catch on until the 1694 charter of 
the Bank of England. See I WILLIAM ROBERT SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF 
ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND )RISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 51-52 (1912); 3 WILLIAM 
ROBERT SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK 
COMPANIES TO 1720, at 205 (1912). 
98. See O'Donnell, sup ra note 96, at 61. 
99. See 5-6 W. & M., c. 20 (Eng.). 
I 00. See Bank Act, supra note 93, at § 7(2). 
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ment by the directors. 101 In fact, it is somewhat ironic that American 
corporate governance has followed a sort of English parliamentary 
model under which the board appoints the company's chief executive, 
whereas early English corporations often followed a model closer to 
American political practice of having the members directly elect the 
company's chief executive. 102 In any event, by the cJose of the eight-
eenth century, the Bank of England's court of proprietors would simply 
approve the "house list" of candidates for directorships prepared by the 
existing directors 103 -thus establishing the historical roots of the separa-
tion of ownership and control. While, in this regard, the Bank of Eng-
land's practice provided an early harbinger of the divergence of the 
board-centered governance model from the realities that prevail in the 
publicly held corporation, in another way, the Bank of England's board 
followed the model. At its inception, the Bank of England's board met 
weekly to participate in running the bank, and, throughout the bank's 
history, committees of Bank of England directors remained actively in-
volved in the bank's management. 104 
2. The Companies Established to Colonize America 
The English corporations chartered to establish colonies in what 
became the United States of America probably also influenced early 
American corporations to adopt board governance. In this case, however, 
the influence would have been subtler, since these companies had passed 
from the scene by the time Americans formed business corporations. 
Still, it is likely that the pattern of board governance established by these 
colonizing companies- which continued to reverberate in the political 
institutions of the thirteen states- made Americans comfortable with the 
notion of corporate governing boards. 
In 1606, James I granted a charter to two companies for purposes of 
trade and colonization in North America. This charter granted what was 
earlier referred to as the London Company, and later became known as 
the Virginia Company, the right to plant a colony at any place between 
the thirty-fourth and forty-first parallels, while what was typically re-
ferred to as the Plymouth Company could plant a colony between the 
thirty-eighth and forty-fifth parallels. Each company consisted of certain 
"knights, gentlemen, merchants and other adventurers" named in the 
charter, plus any other persons whom the original members of the com-
IO I. See O'DonneJJ, supra note 96, at 61. 
I 02. See infra text accompanying note 226. 
I 03. See O' Donnell , supra note 96, at 62-63. 
I 04. See id at 61, 66. 
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pany allowed to join the company. The charter provided for governance 
through two types of councils. Each colony would have a local resident 
council of thirteen members appointed by the king. At the same time, the 
king would appoint a "Council of Virginia" of thirteen members in Eng-
land for "superior managing and direction." 105 Notice that, while these 
companies followed a governance model based on boards, they did not 
at this point follow the model of a board elected by the members of the 
company. 
James I's attempt to deprive the members of the London Company 
of the power to select the council, however, proved unsatisfactory in the 
aftermath of the disappointing results from the Jamestown colony. As a 
result, in 1609, a new charter was issued for the London Company, now 
called the 'Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the 
City of London for the First Colony of Virginia ." This new charter 
placed the executive power over the company in the hands of a treasurer 
and deputy treasurer, 106 and also established a new governing council in 
England. Significantly, the company's council was elected by the mem-
bers of the company, rather than appointed by the king. 107 Membership 
in the company, in tum, was available to persons who contributed 
money towards the colony. 108 Hence, at this point, the London Company 
had adopted common features of the board-centered model of corporate 
governance. As far as local governance at the colony, the 1609 charter 
eliminated the local council and provided for control by a governor ap-
pointed by the company's council in England. 109 
Three years later, yet another iteration occurred in the governance 
scheme for the London Company. Interestingly, the new charter issued 
for the London Company in 1612 represented something of a move 
away from board governance, and an additional flow of power directly 
to the members of the company. The 1612 charter limited the authority 
of the council, on its own, to handling "matters of less consequence and 
weight as shall from time to time happen touching and concerning" the 
105. 2 JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 158-59 
(1905). 
I 06. The odd designation of the chief executive officer as the "treasurer" suggests that the 
principal contemplated focus for the company's activities involved raising and spending money in 
support of the colonization. 
107. See William C. Morey, The Genesis of a Written Constitution I ANN. AMER. ACAD. POL. 
& Soc. SCI. 538-39 ( 1890). 
I 08. The charter called for all persons who contributed money to the venture to be admitted to 
membership by action of the treasurer and any three existing members. See 2 DA VIS, supra note 
105, at 162. 
109. See Morey, supra note 107, at 539. 
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colony . To handle "matters and affairs of greater weight and impor-
tance ," such as the manner of government to be used, the disposition of 
land and possessions , and the settling and establishing of trade, the 1612 
charter called for quarterly assemblies comprised of the council and 
members of the company sitting as one body. These assemblies , which 
the charter entitled "The Four Great and General Courts of the Council 
and Company of Adventurers of Virginia, " also were empowered to 
elect members of the council and officers of the company . At this point, 
control of the local situation at the colony lay in the hands of a governor 
appointed by the assembly. 110 In the end, however, this governance 
structure contributed to, or at least did not prevent , the company ' s undo-
ing. In 1624, James I obtained the dissolution of the London Company 
through a quo warranto proceeding. 111 
Meanwhile, back at the Plymouth Company, the company received 
a new charter in 1620 under the name "The Council established at Ply-
mouth , in the County of Devon , for the planting, ordering , and govern-
ing of New England, in America." As suggested by this name , the mem-
bership in the company became synonymous with membership in the 
governing council. 112 The charter limited membership to forty members , 
who were named in the charter and held memberships for life, and who 
filled vacancies by vote of the existing members. Needless to say, this 
represents a substantial deviation from the model of governance through 
a board of representatives elected by the owners of the company . After 
an unsuccessful effort to establish a colony at the mouth of the Kem1ebec 
River in 1607, the Plymouth Company largely confined its activities to 
granting other groups the license to establish colonies or trade in parts of 
the territory to which the Plymouth Company had received the exclusive 
rights in its charter .113 
While the Plymouth Company itself did little to establish the model 
of corporate governance through elected boards , it indirectly played a 
role in spreading this model. In 1628, John Winthrop and others secured 
from the Plymouth Company a grant of land from a point three miles 
north of the Merrimac River to a point three miles south of the Charles 
River. The next year , after obtaining confirmation of this grant from 
Charles I, Winthrop and his associates obtained a charter to form a cor-
poration named the "Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay 
110. See id. at 540-41 . 
111. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 105, at 169 (noting that James I opposed grants of free and popu-
lar government). 
112. See id. at 170 . 
113. See id. at 169-7 1. 
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in New England" (typically referred to as the Massachusetts Bay Com-
pany). The governance scheme set out in the charter of the Massachu-
setts Bay Company borrowed from the London Company and exhibited 
features of the board-centered model of corporate governance missing 
from the Plymouth Company . The charter called for a governor , deputy 
governor, and eighteen so-called "assistants." As we shall see later, 114 
the term "assistants" is one of the earliest English designations for what 
we now would call directors. The charter named the first governor, dep-
uty governor and assistants for the Massachusetts Bay Company, but 
called for the subsequent election of persons to hold these positions by 
the members of the company. The charter called for at least monthly 
meetings of the governor ( or deputy governor) and assistants to direct 
the affairs of the company. Copying from the London Company, the 
charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company also called for four "great 
and general courts" attended by the governor or deputy governor , at least 
six assistants, and the members of the company, to take place every year. 
These general courts had the power to elect officers for the company. 115 
There was one key difference, however , between the governance 
provisions of the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company and the 
governance provisions of the charter of the London Company from 
which the Massachusetts Bay Company copied. Unlike the London 
Company's charter, the charter for the Massachusetts Bay Company did 
not specify that the company's general courts and council had to meet in 
England. Accordingly, the members of the Massachusetts Bay Com-
pany- who were using the company structure to further a religious and 
political agenda- met in Massachusetts. 116 As a result, the elected gov-
erning board of the Massachusetts Bay Company became, in effect, the 
Massachusetts colonial legislature. The corporate charter for the Massa-
chusetts Bay Company remained the governing constitution for the Mas-
sachusetts colony until 1691, when a new royal charter for the colony 
replaced the Massachusetts Bay Company's corporate charter. The 1691 
charter, however, preserved the existing governance structure, except 
that the king thereafter appointed the colony's governor. 117 
The upshot was that the Massachusetts Bay Company had even 
more influence on the structure of American government than it did on 
the governance of American business. The same is true of the London 
Company, whose members, in 1621, adopted an "Ordinance and Consti-
114. See discuss ion infra Parts 111.B.3, IY .B.2 -3. 
115. See 2 Davis, supra note I 05 , at 173. 
116. See GEORGE CAWSTON & A.H. KEANE, THE EARLY CHA RTERED COMPANIES 210 (1896). 
117. See Morey, supra note I 07, at 550. 
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tution" for the government of Virginia, which, copying from their own 
charter, called for the governance of the colony by a governor, council of 
assistants, and a general assembly at the colony. 118 The governance 
structure established by the London Company for the Virginia colony in 
1621 provided the model for other colonies in Maryland and the Caroli-
nas, while the governance structure established by the Massachusetts 
Bay Company's 1628 charter provided the model for other colonies in 
Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire. 119 In the end, as the 
American states began to charter corporations, the notion of an elected 
board may well have been comfortable because of its similarity to the 
governance scheme of the state legislatures-the irony being that the 
governance scheme of the state legislatures stemmed from the board 
governance of the corporations formed to colonize North America. 
3. The Trading Companies 
While both the Bank of England, and the companies established to 
colonize America , apparently influenced American acceptance of corpo-
rate board governance, it was the English trading companies that devel-
oped board governance as a model for a business corporation. 
a. The Joint Stock Trading Companies 
The charters of the famous English trading companies , such as the 
East India Company, the Russia Company, the Eastland Company , the 
Levant Company, the Hudson's Bay Company , and the South Sea Com-
pany, evidence the consistent use of governing boards. 12° For example, 
at the outset of the seventeenth century, Queen Elizabeth I granted a 
charter to 216 knights, aldermen and merchants to become "a body poli-
tic and corporate" by the name of the "Governor and Company of Mer-
chants of London, trading into the East Indies." The result was to create 
what came to be known as the East India Company . The East India 
Company's charter committed the direction of the voyages , and the 
management of all other things belonging to the company, to a gover-
nor121 and twenty-four persons called "committees." Hence, the title 
"committees" (like the title "assistants" encountered in the Massachu-
setts Bay Company) predated the title "director" or "trustee" as the label 
118. Id. at 542. 
119. Id. at 544, 550. 
120. For a tabular listing of the governance structures of English joi nt stock companies until 
1720, showing predominately board governance, see 3 SCOTT, supra note 97, at 462-480. 
121. The chief executive officer of such early corporations commonly had the title "governor, " 
rather than "president" or the more modern "CEO." 
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attached to the elected members of a corporation's governing board. The 
charter named Sir Thomas Smith as the first governor, but provided that 
the members of the company annually would elect the committees, who 
would choose from among themselves a govemor. 122 
The charter of the East India Company was following well-
established precedent in calling for the use of a governing board. In 
1554, Philip and Mary granted a charter to what came to be known as 
the "Russia" or "Muscovy" Company. 123 The charter named Sebastian 
Cabot as governor for life, and provided for four "sad, 124 discreet and 
honest" members to be consuls, 125 and twenty-four members to be assis-
tants. Members of the Russia Company annually elected the consuls and 
assistants. 126 Interestingly, while most records were lost in a fire, the ex-
tant records of the Russia Company suggest a familiar deviation between 
the role of the board called for in the charter of the Russia Company and 
the more limited role the board actually took. For example, the members 
(stockholders), acting as a whole, seem to have taken a more extensive 
role in managing the company than suggested by the charter (which only 
empowered the members to elect the consuls and assistants). Records 
show that the members at general meetings selected "factors" (agents) to 
represent the Company in Russia, approved contracts and statements of 
account, and resolved disputed charges of private trading leveled against 
servants of the Company. At the opposite extreme, on many occasions, 
the governor, perhaps with the input of a few of the major members, 
seems to have acted for the company. By contrast, despite receiving 
broad powers in the charter, there is little in the records as far as actions 
by the board of assistants. 127 
122. See, e.g., CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 116, at 87; O'Donnell, supra note 96, at 67. 
123. The unbe lievably long and convoluted official name of this company was "The Merchants 
Adventurers for the Discovery of Lands, Territories, Isles and Seigniories unknown, and not by the 
Seas and Naviga tions, before this said late Adventure or Enterprise by Sea or Navigation, com-
monly frequented." 2 DAVIS,supra note 105, at 98. 
124. Id. As in steadfast, trustworthy and wise, rather than unhappy. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 2617 (1989). 
125. As discussed later (see infra text accompanying notes 252-54), the title "consul" comes 
from medieva l Italian municipal governments, from whence it migrated to municipal governments 
elsewhere in medieval Europe. The term also migrated into Italian business-related entities when , 
for example, the organization of the Bank of Saint George in Genoa included four consuls, nomi-
nated by the chief officials, to superintend its finances. See 1 SCOTI, supra note 97, at 20. 
126. See O'Donnell, supra note 96, at 60. 
127. See T.S. WILLAN, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE RUSSIA COMPANY 1553-160 3, 22-24 
(1959). 
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In 1579, Elizabeth I granted a charter to the "Fellowship of East-
land Merchants" (commonly referred to as the Eastland Company). 128 
Under the charter, the government of the Eastland Company consisted of 
a governor, one or more deputy governors, and twenty-four assistants . 
Members of the Eastland Company annually elected the governor and 
deputy governor(s), but, in an unusual provision , the assistants held of-
fice on good behavior. 129 
The Levant Company started life with a different governance struc-
ture. This company came into official existence in 1581 when Elizabeth 
I granted a charter to Sir Edward Osborn, Thomas Smith, Richard Staper 
and William Garret to become "The Company of Merchants of the Le-
vant." The charter named Osborn as the Company's first governor , but, 
with only four initial members, the charter did not reflect any need for 
assistants. The charter authorized Osborn and Staper to admit up to 
twelve other English subjects into the company, while the queen retained 
the right to admit two more into the company. In 1592, Elizabeth I 
granted a new charter to the company. This new charter named fifty-
three members , and authorized the company to admit additional mem-
bers without the numerical limitations of the old charter. 130 With more 
members , the governance structure now changed. The new charter called 
not only for a governor , but also for the members to elect annually 
twelve assistants. Growth in the company produced a new charter in 
1605. Admission into the company was now open to all merchants upon 
payment of a fee. In tenns of governance , the new charter increased the 
number of assistants to eighteen. 131 
English trading companies founded after the East India Compan y 
also had charters calling for governing boards. For exampl e, in 1670, the 
English government granted a charter creating the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany-o fficially titled "The Gov ernor and Compan y of Adventurers of 
England trading into Hudson' s Bay"- for the purpo se of trade in what is 
now Canada. Under the charter , the proprietors of the compan y elected 
annually a governor , deputy governor, and a board of seven commit-
tees.132 In 171 I, the infamous South Sea Compan y-o fficially named 
"Governor and Company of Merchant s of Great Britain Tradin g to the 
South Seas and other parts of America, and for Encouragin g the Fish-
128. The name Eas tland comes from the English reference to the Baltic as the "Eas t Sea ." 
129. See O 'Donnell, supra note 96, at 65. 
130. The expanding membersh ip apparen tly was an attempt to acco mmodate merchants whose 
trade in the Medit erranean fell victim to the war w ith Spain. See I SCOTT, supra note 97, at 85. 
13 1. See 2 DAV IS, sup ra note I 05 , at 90- 91. 
132. See CAWSTON & KE ANE, supra no te 116, at 279-80. 
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ery"-received its charter. The principal business of the South Sea 
Company seems to have included equal parts holding British govern-
ment debt and encouraging an ill-fated speculation in its own stock (the 
so-called South Sea Bubble ).133 The South Sea Company had a gover-
nor, sub-governor, deputy governor, and a board of thirty directors. 134 
Sadly, the plea of ignorance asserted by many of the company's direc-
tors during the investigation and prosecution following the company's 
collapse in 1720135 is eerily reminiscent of the response of directors to 
scandals ever since. 
These English trading companies not only evidence the use of cor-
porate governing boards going back almost half a millennia, they played 
a critical role in establishing the use of boards as the governance mecha-
nism for the business corporation. For example, the East India Company 
appears to have pioneered various aspects of modem board practice . As 
discussed earlier in this Article, 136 a key power of the typical modern 
corporate board-which is especially important if one views the princi-
pal role of the board to be monitoring the performance of corporate man-
agement-is the power to hire and fire the chief executive officer. The 
initial charter of the East India Company may have been the first ( or at 
least the first well documented) corporate charter to grant the power to 
the governing board to elect the corporation's governor, rather than 
leave this power in the hands of the company's members. 137 Interest-
ingly, as mentioned above, 138 American corporations were quicker to 
adopt this practice than other English corporations. Over the years, vari-
ous further changes occurred in the governance of the East India Com-
pany, by successive charter or otherwise. For example, during the eight-
eenth century, the committees elected a chairman and deputy chairman 
to preside over their meetings, thereby establishing an office of chair 
separate from that of governor' 39 -something pushed for by reformers of 
boards today. 140 Another example of governance practices introduced 
133. See generally EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF 
FINANCIAL SPECULATION ch. 3 (1999). 
134. 3 SCOTT, supra note 97, at 295-96. 
135. Among the South Sea Company's thirty directors was an inner group, who were behind 
the company's fraudulent activities, and a passive outer group. See JOHN G. SPERLING, THE SOUTH 
SEA COMPANY: AN HISTORICAL ESSAY AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL FINDING LIST 27 (1962) . Not sur-
prisingly , the passive board members sought to shift the blame to the directors who were active in 
the fraud. See JOHN CARSWELL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 230 (1960). 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25 . 
137. O'Donnell, supra note 96, at 62. 
138. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02. 
139. See O'Donnell , supra note 96, at 65-66. 
140. See Branson, supra note 3, at IO 15. 
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into the East India Company that remains common today comes from an 
act of Parliament in 1773. This act introduced staggered terms to the 
company 's board of what were by then referred to as directors , with one-
quarter of the directors elected every year . 141 
The most critical innovation that occurred with these trading com-
panies, however, did not involve a change in the structure of the govern-
ing board. Instead , it involved what was going on around the board. 
These companie s were undergoing a metamorphosis from so-called 
regulated companies- essentially guilds whose membership consisted of 
merchants conducting independent operations under the company's 
franchise-into joint stock companies, in which voting power and eco-
nomic return came from investing in a common enterprise. While this 
evolution did not alter the structure of the governing board , it fundamen-
tally changed what the board was supposed to do. The board turned from 
a regulatory body, which preserved an exclusive franchise on behalf of a 
group of merchants who conducted individual businesses, into a supervi-
sory body , which had overall responsibility for running a business. 142 
The Eastland Company provides a good example of a regulated 
company. The charter of the Eastland Company granted the merchants in 
the company the exclusive right among English subjects to trade with 
Scandinavia and the Baltic region (but not Russia). 143 Such exclusive 
rights were typical of the English trading company charters , which at-
tempted to carve up the world into a series of franchises . So, the charter 
of the Russia Company granted the Company exclusive rights as far as 
English subjects to trade in Russia, as well as in "lands of infidels " dis-
covered by merchants in the Company. 144 The charter of the Levant 
Company granted members of this Company exclusive trading rights 
with Turkey. 145 Perhaps most generous of all, the charter of the East In-
dia Company granted its members exclusive trading rights in a territory 
described as encompas sing all of Africa, Asia and America from the 
Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan. 146 
As a regula ted company , the Eastland Company did not conduct 
operations as a corporation . Instead, the merchant s who were the mem-
14 1. See O' Donnell. supra note 96, at 60. In one respect, the board of the East India Company 
seems to have been unusual when compared with modern practice. The board purportedly met every 
day during 1615 to deal with the growth of the Company's business. I SCOTT, supra note 97, at 163 
( citing a resolution granting the board members a £ I 000 honorarium). 
142. See WILLAN, supra note 127, at 19-21. 
143. See CA WSTON & KEANE, supra note 116, at 61. 
144. See 2 DA VIS, supr a note l 05, at 98 . 
145. See id. at 88 . 
146. See CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 116, at 87-88. 
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bers of the company conducted trading operations, either individually or 
in ad hoc partnerships. 147 This fact, in tum, leads to a critical question 
from the standpoint of the history of board governance: If a regulated 
company did not conduct operations as a corporation, what was the pur-
pose of having a governing board? The answer is that the board adopted 
ordinances to govern the activities of the members of the company. 148 
For example, the board of the Eastland Company adopted a prohibition 
on "colouring" goods. 149 Colouring referred to selling goods of a non-
member merchant as a member's own. By operating in this fashion as 
undisclosed principals, non-members attempted to circumvent the com-
pany's exclusive franchise. As this example illustrates, the role of a 
board of a regulated company was not to have overall responsibility for 
operating a business, but, rather, to impose rules on individual merchants 
in order to preserve a monopoly. 
The Russia Company may have been the first joint stock com-
pany.150 In the joint stock company, instead of each merchant trading in 
his own stock (merchandise), the merchants subscribed to a fund that fi-
nanced a combined or joint stock of merchandise for trading by agents of 
the company-hence, the title "joint stock company" from which derives 
the current label of stockholder. 151 There were a couple of motivations 
for the evolution from the regulated company to the joint stock com-
pany. The obvious motivation is the greater need for financing, and 
greater risk of failure, as trading voyages went from the close (the Bal-
tic) to the far. (The members of the Russia Company originally hoped to 
find a northeast passage to Asia. 152) The joint stock principle raised more 
money, and spread the risk among more participants, than did individual 
operations in the regulated company. 153 There may have been another 
motivation. Limiting operations to trading under the company's direc-
147. See WILLAN, supra note 127, at 19-20. 
148. Id at 20. 
149. See, e.g., M. Schmitthoff, The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 74, 
82 (1939). 
150. See I SCOTT, supra note 97, J 7. The discerning reader may have noticed that the Russia 
Company predated the Eastland Company, despite the fact that the Russia Company started as a 
joint stock company, while the Eastland Company was a regulated company. This shows that the 
evolution from regulated to joint stock companies was an erratic, rather than a linear, proce ss. In-
deed, the Russia Company itself regressed into a regulated company later in its life. See inji-a note 
162. 
151. For a discussion of the meanings ascribed to the word "stock" in the ear ly joint stock 
companies, see I SCOTT, supra note 97, at 158. 
152. See id at 18. 
153. See. e.g., id. at 17; Meir Kohn, Business Organization in Pre-Industrial Europe, 27, 
(SSRN, Working Paper No. 03-09, 2003). 
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tion financed through a joint stock fund could serve as a way to combat 
, h l · 154 practices sue as co ounng. 
At its inception, the East India Company seems to have straddled 
the worlds of the regulated and the joint stock companies-so much so 
that historians disagree over whether the East India Company started as 
a regulated company and evolved into a joint stock company, or whether 
the East India Company was a joint stock company from the outset. 155 
The conflict arises from the fact that the original charter of the East India 
Company preserved the right of the members to trade individually under 
the company's franchise, much as in a regulated company, and the fact 
that not all of the members in the East India Company subscribed to the 
early voyages financed on a joint stock basis.156 In any event, historians 
agree that during the first half of the seventeenth century, in lieu of hav-
ing permanent capital, members of the East India Company subscribed 
to joint stock funds that would finance a certain number of trading voy-
ages to India. These funds then were supposed to be wound up and the 
proceeds distributed among the subscribers. In the middle of the seven-
teenth century, a combination of accounting confusion caused by this 
system,157 and the continuing need to justify its monopoly, 158 led to a re-
structuring in which a permanent joint stock fund replaced the earlier 
funds.159 Beyond moving to a permanent capital, two critical changes 
occurred in the rights of the members-historians disagree whether these 
occurred in the middle or toward the end of the seventeenth century. 
Voting rights began to depend upon the amount each member invested 
in the permanent joint stock, instead of being available to all mem-
bers.160 In addition, the company no longer granted members the right to 
154. See Schmitthoff , supra note 149, at 91. 
155. Compare 2 DAVIS , supra note I 05, at I I 8-19 (discussing how the East India Company 
conducted voyages through individual merchants and merchant groups until 1612, when it began 
trading voyages as a corporation), with SCOTT, supra note 97, at 92-101 (stating that from its incep-
tion, the East India Company conducted its voyages on a joint stock basis, even though the members 
invested on a per voyage basis rather than into a permanent capital or joint stock of the company). 
156. See Schmitthoff, supra note 149, at 90-91. 
I 57. The confusion developed when the compa ny began to raise later joint stock funds without 
winding up the earlier joint stocks. Also perplexing was how to account for the permanent facilities 
the company had acquired in India and England (often referred to as "dead stock," as opposed to the 
trading or "quick stock"). 
158. Several competing groups were able to obtain licenses from English kings to trade in the 
East India Company's territory. These licenses were sometimes rationalized on the ground that the 
East India Company had not made settlements or established trade as promised. 
159. See 2 DA VIS, supra note l 05, at 119-22. 
160. See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 97, at 465 (noting that voting rights in the East India Com-
pany were limited in 1650 to one vote for each£ 500 contribution); 2 DAVIS supra note 105, at 129-
122 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:89 
trade on their own under the company's franchise. 161 The result of these 
two changes was to tie the benefits of membership in the English East 
India Company- both in terms of voting control and in terms of any 
economic retum--entirely to a subscription into a common fund for the 
company's activities, and thereby complete the transformation of the 
company from a confederation of merchants into a vehicle for passive 
investment by the general public. 162 
The development of the joint stock company, by setting the stage 
for transferable ownership interests in which voting power can depend 
upon the number of interests purchased and in which voting power 
might become widely dispersed among passive investors, obviously has 
tremendous implications for corporate governance. It laid the ground-
work for the separation of ownership from control, but also created the 
ability for today's hostile takeovers. For purposes of this Article, how-
ever, dealing as we are with the historical and political origins of corpo-
rate board, the development of the joint stock company has another im-
pact. The same board structure that existed to enact and enforce rules 
governing the conduct of independent merchants in the regulated com-
pany (such as the Eastland Company) found itself pressed into service to 
manage a large business venture in the joint stock company (such as the 
Russia and East India Companies). This occurred without any evident 
consideration as to the different nature of these tasks, or whether an in-
stitution developed for one task best fit the needs of the other function. 
30 (noting that the new charte r of 1693 gave one vote in the genera l court for each£ 1000 in contri-
bution, up to a maximum of ten votes) . 
161. See, e.g., Samuel Williston, The Histo,y of the Law of Business Corporations before I 800, 
in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 195, 200 (1909) (noting that members 
lost the right to trade independentl y under the East India Company's franchise toward the end of the 
seve nteenth century); William Mitche ll, Early Forms of Partnership, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 183, 194 ( 1909) (noting that members lost the right to trade 
independently under the East India Company's franchise in 1654). 
162. Interestingly enough, the Russia Com pany evolved in the opposite direction. It started 
with permanent capital, but disappointing results durin g later years led the memb ers to demand a 
repayment of their cap ital. Thereafter, the company began operating throug h subscriptions and peri-
odic redistributions. This practi ce, in tum, resulted in fewer members hav ing a greate r share in the 
company, and more complaints about the company 's monopoly becoming concentrated in the hands 
of a few. These comp laint s, as well as the accounting confusion resu lting from the lack of a perma-
nent capital, finally led to the com pany becoming a regulated , instead of a joint stock, company. See 
WILLAN, supra note 127, at 269-73. The Levant Com pany fo llowed a somewh at similar regressio n 
from joint stock to regulated company. Id. at 273. 
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b. The First English Trading Companies 
The use of boards of "assistants" or "committees" by the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century English trading companies appears to derive 
from a pattern set by two of the earliest companies of English merchants 
engaged in foreign trade: The Company of the Merchants of the Staple, 
and the Company of Merchant Adventurers. The history of these two or-
ganizations is even fuzzier than is the case with the joint stock and regu-
lated corporations discussed thus far. For purposes of this Article, how-
ever, it is sufficient to focus on several facts about these two companies. 
In each case, the company adopted governance by a board coupled with 
a chief executive officer. Further, these two companies apparently were 
the first companies of English merchants organized for foreign trade 
with at least some degree of the sort of exclusive rights from the crown 
that would motivate the later English trading companies to seek charters. 
As such, the inevitable inference is that the board governance structure 
adopted by the Company of the Merchants of the Staple and the Com-
pany of Merchant Adventurers provided the model followed by the later 
English trading companies when the later English trading companies 
drafted charters calling for board governance. 163 The other point worth 
noting is that neither the Company of the Merchants of the Staple, nor 
the Company of Merchant Adventurers, was anything remotely like a 
joint stock company. Instead, these were regulated companies, like the 
Eastland Company, in which the role of the board was to enact and en-
force rules governing the activities of individual merchants, rather than 
manage a business. 
Broadly speaking, the Merchants of the Staple engaged in the ex-
port of English raw wool, while the Merchant Adventurers engaged in 
the export of English cloth, as well as other English manufactured 
goods. 164 The Merchants of the Staple take their name from the fixed 
place (the staple) to which, at various times, English law limited all sales 
of raw wool exports. 165 The system began with voluntary efforts at the 
163. Reinforcing this inference are the similarities in the composition of the boards of the Mer-
chant Adventurers and the Russia and Eastland Companies (twenty-four "assistants" in each case), 
as well as the fact that many of the founding member s of the Russia Company were members of the 
Merchants of the Staple or the Merchant Adventurers . WILLAN, supra note 127, at 2 1. 
164. Not surprisingly , thi s demarcation between the two companies was subject to some dis-
pute, particular ly once a decline in the wool trade motivated members of the Merchants of the Sta-
ple to sell cloth. See SIR PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS, A LICENSE TO TRADE: THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
CHARTERED COMPANIES 10 (J 974). 
165. The interest of the Merchants of the Staple in such a limitation , particularly insofar as it 
could reduce competition and allow control over prices, is obvious enough. The English kings saw 
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end of the thirteenth century by Edward I to encourage all wool exports 
to go through one market (first at Dordrecht and then at Antwerp). It ap-
pears that the English merchants handling these wool sales obtained a 
charter from the duke of Brabant (now part of Belgium) allowing them 
to hold assemblies, and, later, to elect a "mayor," in order to govern the 
merchants' affairs. 166 The result seemingly was to establish something of 
an organized merchant society or company, but apparently with a simple 
governance structure built around an executive officer and decisions by 
all of the members. The staple system became compulsory in 1313, with 
the establishment of a Mayor and Council of the Merchants of the Sta-
ple, who were empowered to choose a staple town for all wool ex-
ports.167 They first chose Saint-Omer (in Flanders), but tussles over 
where the constantly moving staple would be, and who would be al-
lowed to trade, occupied the next half-century. After the Ordinance of 
the Staple of 1353 brought the whole thing for a few years to fifteen 
English towns ( each of which had its own Mayor of the Staple and sup-
porting officers), 168 the staple gravitated toward Calais (which was then 
under English control). As a result, the Merchants of the Staple became 
the Company of the Staple of Calais. 169 Significantly for purposes of this 
Article, a council of twenty-four governed the company in Calais (and, 
interestingly enough, for the two years between 1363 and 1365 also gov-
erned the town). 170 Hence, the Merchants of the Staple, to some extent as 
early as 1313, and certainly by 1363, had adopted a system of board 
governance. 
Despite its somewhat swashbuckling sound, "merchant adventur-
ers" was a label used by merchants who engaged in the export trade of 
manufactured goods. The early history of the merchant adventurers as an 
organized company is murky. English merchants trading in Antwerp ob-
tained a pair of charters from the dukes of Brabant in the thirteenth cen -
tury, which allowed them to establish a mayor and a court (an assem-
bly).171 It is unclear, however, whether the Company of Merchant 
this as a device to extract revenues from the wool merchants. See EILEEN PO\VER, THE WOOL 
TRADE TN MEDIEVAL Hf STORY 87-90 (1941 ). 
166. See id at 95-96. 
167. See L.F. SALZMAN, ENGLISH TRADE TN THE MIDDLE AGES, 289-290 (1931 ). 
168. See id at 293. 
169. See POWER, supra note 165, at 97-99. 
170. See GRIFFITHS, supra note 164, at 7. According to some historical sources, there were 
initially twenty-six merchants in charge of the company at Calais, but this probably comes from 
adding the two mayors (one for the company and one for the town) to the twenty-four member 
council. See SALZMAN, supra note 167, at 295. 
171. See GRrFFrTHS, supra note 164, at 9. 
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Adventurers, as it ultimately became known, bore enough of a relation-
ship to these earlier expatriate English merchants to support the later 
company's efforts to claim this lineage, particularly insofar as the Mer-
chants of the Staple also laid claim to at least the later of these charters. 
Early in the fifteenth century, Henry IV of England granted a charter to 
English merchant exporters trading outside England (mostly in the Low 
Countries), which allowed the merchants to elect a governor over them-
selves.172 The role of the governor under the charter was to resolve dis-
putes among the English merchants and to aid the English merchants in 
their claims against foreign merchants. The governor, with the assent of 
the merchants (presumably through an open assembly), could also estab-
lish ordinances for the group and impose reasonable punishments upon 
merchants disobeying these ordinances. 173 During the fifteenth century, 
merchant exporters operating from England, unlike their countrymen 
operating abroad, had no formal separate organization. Instead, many of 
them apparently were members of the Mercers Company, a London 
merchant's guild, where, by the middle of the century, they seem to have 
begun meeting as a separate group. By the late fifteenth century, the 
London merchant exporters had come to view themselves as a distinct 
fellowship with the title "Merchant Adventurers," and evidently were 
operating in connection with the English merchants in the Low Coun-
tries. This is evidenced by a 1485 petition to the English crown, in which 
the London merchant exporters designated themselves "Merchant Ad-
venturers, Citizens of the City of London, into the parts of Holland, Zee-
land, Brabant and Flanders ." 174 
In 1505, Henry VII took a critical step in bringing together the mer-
chant adventurers as a coherent company. He granted a charter to The 
Company of Merchant Adventurers, giving the Company a monopoly on 
trade in export of English manufactures; albeit, membership in the com-
pany had to be open to any English merchant who paid a fee. More sig-
nificantly for purposes of this Article, this charter authorized the com-
pany ( which would be headquartered on the Continent, rather than in 
England) to elect "Four and Twenty of the most sadd [sic] discreet and 
honest Persons of divers [sic] fellowships" to be "Assistants" to the 
governor. 175 The function of the governor and the assistants was to 
resolve disputes among merchants and to enact ordinances for the 
regulation of the members of the company. 176 During the first half of the 
172. See EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND 165 (1901). 
173. See2 DAVIS,supranote !05,at74-75. 
174. GRIFFITHS, supra note 164, at I 0. 
175. See CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 116, at 249-54 . 
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the members of the company. 176 During the first half of the sixteenth 
century, merchant adventurers in English cities that perhaps were jealous 
of the London merchants' dominance created their own companies of 
Merchant Adventurers. These companies often also employed a board 
governance structure, with elected governors and twelve or eighteen as-
sistants. 177 In 1564, however, Elizabeth I issued a new charter to the 
Merchant Adventurers. This charter confirmed governance of the com-
pany in a governor, his deputy, and, again of most significance to this 
Article, twenty -four assistants, to be headquartered abroad, and who had 
jurisdiction over merchant adventurers wherever they operated. 178 
All told, both the Company of Merchant Adventurers and the Com-
pany of the Merchants of the Staple had governing boards whose struc-
ture matches, and evidently provided the model for, the governing 
boards of trading companies , such as the Russia, Eastland, and East In-
dia, companies. As suggested by the charter of the Merchant Adventur-
ers, the boards of the Company of Merchant Adventurers and the Com-
pany of the Merchants of the Staple existed to resolve disputes and to 
pass ordinances regulating the conduct of the members. 179 The upshot is 
that the corporate board of directors did not develop as an institution to 
manage the business corporation. Rather, it is an institution the business 
corporation inherited when the business corporation evolved out of so-
cieties of independent merchants. These earlier merchant societies or 
companies, in tum, apparently adopted boards to replace less structured 
governance under a combination of officers and decision-making by as-
semblies of the entire membership. 
C. Continental European Antecedents 
While American use of corporate boards evidently traces to English 
practice , it would be a mistake to give the English sole credit for devel-
oping the board-centered model of corporate governance that is used 
around the world. Rather, it appears that board-centered corporate gov-
176. Among the ordinances imposed on the members of the Merchant Adventurers was a pro-
hibition on marrying women born outside of England. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 105, at 80. 
177. See id at 79. Sometimes, however , these non-London companies of Merchant Adventur-
ers, following older patterns of guild governance , elected so-called masters and wardens, instead of 
governors and assistants. 
178. See CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 116, at 255-77. 
179. The fact that the Company of Merchant Adventurers collected admission fees and fines 
meant that there was some need for auditing, but this does not seem to have been a function of the 
board of assistants. See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmern1an, Agency Problems, Auditing. and the 
Theory of the Firm : Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON. 613, 620-21 (1983). 
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ernance, even in its early stages, 180 was developing in continental Europe 
on a roughly parallel track to its development in England. 
One nice example of the parallel development of corporate boards 
in England and in continental Europe comes from the East India compa-
nies. Two years after the formation of the English East India Company, 
the Dutch government chartered the Dutch (or "United ") East India 
Company . The charter (or octroi) of the Dutch East India Company pro-
vided for governance by a general council of governors (bewindheb-
bers).181 This council had sixty members, broken down into a certain 
number of representatives from each of the various "chambers " which 
had come together to form the Dutch East India Company . These cham-
bers consisted of smaller groups of merchants in Amsterdam (which had 
twenty representatives on the council), Rotterdam and Delft (which had 
fourteen representatives), Hoorn and Enkhuizen (which had fourteen 
representatives), and Zealand (which had twelve representatives). 182 
These merchant groups already had formed shipping companies for trade 
with the East Indies, and, at least at the inception of the Dutch East India 
Company, actually may have conducted the voyages (while the overall 
Dutch company, much like the English regulated companies , served to 
create a cartel and to present a united face when dealing with outsid-
ers ).1 83 Evidently , a sixty-member board turned out to be unwieldy, and 
so the Dutch East India Company established a second smaller board 
(the Collegium) with seventeen members. This board, too, also had a 
certain number of representatives from each of the chambers- in this 
case, Amsterdam received eight, and Zealand four , and the other four 
chambers each received one. The seventeenth position rotated. 184 
Working backwards , the governance structure of some overseas 
communities of Hanseatic merchant s displayed a parallel to the board 
governance of the Merchant Adventur ers and Merchants of the Staple. In 
medieval Europe, the term "hanse" referred to associations of traveling 
merchants frequenting a foreign country. These merchants banded to-
gether for protection, to secure trading privileges, and to police the trad-
180. There are, of course, significant continental European cont ribu tions to corporate boards 
after the advent of general incorpora tion laws in the United States and elsewhere. These contribu-
tions include, most notably, the German invention of the two-tier board and co-determination. See 
supra notes 7-8, see infra note 399. 
18 I. See Schmitthoff , supr a note 149, at 93-94. 
I 82. See HOLDEN FURBER, RIVA L EMPIRES OF TRA DE IN T HE O RIENT 1600-1800, at I 88 
(1976). 
183. See Schmitthoff, supra note 149, at 94 . 
I 84. See Win fried van den Muijsenberg h, Corpora te Governance: The Dutch Experience, I 6 
TRANSNAT' L L AW. 63, 64 (2002) . 
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ing practices of their fellow merchants. While there were hanse of vari-
ous nationalities (such as a Flemish hanse of London), during the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries, German merchants had important hanse in 
London, Novgorod, Bergen and Bruges. Cooperation, initially on trade 
issues , between the towns from which these German merchants came, 
produced what is known as the Hanseatic League. In London, the Han-
seatic merchants had living quarters and worked in a compound border-
ing the Thames , called the Steelyard. The Steelyard hanse elected an al-
derman and a committee of twelve (one-third elected by the 
Rhinelanders, one-third elected by merchants from Westphalian , Saxon 
and W endish towns, and one-third elected by the Prussians and German 
Baits) to govern the community. Similarly, an alderman and a council 
governed the German merchants in Bergen. The Hanseatic community in 
Bruges had a board of six aldermen until 1472; after which three alder-
men, advised by a committee of twelve, administered the hanse. Like the 
governors (or mayors) and the boards of the Merchant Adventurers and 
Merchants of the Staple, these governing institutions of the Hanseatic 
merchants acted to preserve the group's trade privileges , to enforce rules 
of trade , and to adjudicate disputes among the merchants. 185 
It is important to note, however, that innumerable business organi-
zations in medieval Europe did not have boards. While this is obvious 
for sole proprietorships and small partnerships, even some relatively 
large-scale business organizations in continental Europe of the Middle 
Ages did not have anything like a board. For example , large Italian mer-
cantile and banking companies , such as the Peruzzi and Medici compa-
nies, lacked a board. Instead, these were partnerships operated under the 
domination of a family leader or trusted manager. The Peruzzi company 
(which existed from around 1275 to 1343) operated as a single partner-
ship with branch operations. Partners in the company managed the major 
branches (Avignon, Bruges, London, Nap les, Palermo and Paris), while 
factors (salaried employees) managed lesser branches. All partners resid-
ing in Florence (the company's home city) had the right to participate in 
management, but, as a practical matter , one partner , who gained the con-
fidence of the others, largely ran the business. For almost a century 
(from 1397 to 1494) the Medici conducted banking and manufacturing 
operations. Instead of operat ing as one large partnership , the Medici es-
tablished the equivalent to a holding company arrangement in which 
separate partnerships conducted operations in various locales, while the 
185. See R. de Roover, The Organization of Trade, in THE CAMBRIDGE E CONOMI C HISTORY 
OF E UROPE 111-15 (M.M. Postan et al. eds., 1963). 
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main partnership in Florence retained majority control over the local 
partnerships. As the family members became distracted with Florentine 
politics, a principal administrator (called a ministro) provided overall 
supervision from Florence. 186 Overall, the development of corporate 
boards in Continental Europe is consistent with the English experience: 
corporate boards developed as a governance mechanism for merchant 
societies (like the hanse) or merchant cartels (like the Dutch East India 
Company), and only later evolved into the governance mechanism for 
large business ventures with passive investors. 
IV. THE CONCEPTUAL 0R1GINS OF CORPORA TE BOARDS 
The previous section of this Article looked at when and how corpo-
rate governance through elected boards developed and came to the 
United States. This section asks why such a governance scheme origi-
nated. In other words, from what sources did the early corporations get 
the idea of using elected governing boards? What purpose was this gov-
ernance structure supposed to achieve? Why was this form of govern-
ance employed versus other alternatives? 
In fact, corporate governance by a representative board, working 
with a chief executive officer (a "governor" in the typical parlance of the 
early corporate charters), is a reflection of political practices and ideas 
widespread in Western Europe in the late Middle Ages. Specifically, 
while fictional literature often pictures medieval Europe as a place of 
autocratic governance by kings, 187 European political ideology and prac-
tice in the late Middle Ages, although hardly democratic, often called for 
the use of collective governance by a body of representatives. Examples 
of such representative governance ideas and practices are found in the 
assemblies or parliaments of medieval European kingdoms, in town 
councils, in governing councils for guilds, and in the Church. Given this 
prevalent practice, and the ideology that underlay this practice, it was 
natural for the early corporations to utilize board governance. 
A. Parliamentary Assemblies 
1. The Growth of Parliamentary Assemblies 
European kingdoms in the late twelfth through fourteenth centuries 
widely undertook the development and use of representative assemblies, 
186. See id. at 76-87. 
187. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHA RD Ill. 
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which are precursors of today's parliaments. 188 The English Parliament, 
because of its survival and ultimate influence , is the most noted exam-
ple. 189 The English Parliament emerged in the thirteenth century out of 
several pre-existing practices. Early English kings, like kings elsewhere 
in Western Europe during the early Middle Ages, commonly had coun-
cils of advisors. 190 Power struggles in the thirteenth century between the 
kings and the barons created an impetus toward broader assemblies with 
heads of the clergy and the barons. 191 During the final third of the thir-
teenth century, attendance at English parliaments began to expand be-
yond the King's council , the senior clergy , and the barons, to include 
representatives of counties and towns. 192 The summonses issued by Ed-
ward I to the so-called Model Parliament of 1295 provide a good exam-
ple. These summonses ordered the sheriffs of the counties to cause to be 
elected to attend the parliament, with full power to do the business of the 
parliament, two knights to represent each county, and two citizens to 
represent each city and two burghers to represent each borough within a 
I 88. See THOMAS N. BISSON, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THEIR ORIGINS AND 
NATURE I ( 1973). 
189. See generally WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS 
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1888) [hereinafter STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY]. 
I 90. See SUSAN REYNOLDS, KINGDOMS AND COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 900-1300, at 
302-03, 305 (1984). Anglo-Saxon kings referred to such a council as a witen or witenagemot (as in 
"meeting of the wise"). See JOHN CANNON, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO BRITISH HISTORY 994 
(1997). 
191. For example, King John 's reluctant agreement to the Magna Carta in 1215 codified a pro-
hibition on "aid" (loosely speaking, taxes), except to ransom the king, knight his eldest son, or 
marry his eldest daughter, unless consented to by "common counsel" (commune consilium) com-
posed of archbishops, bishops, abbots, counts, greate r barons, and the king 's tenants-in-chief, sum-
moned on at least forty days' notic e. See MAGNA CARTA OF 1215, reprinted in WILLIAM STUBBS, 
SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: FROM THE 
EARLIEST IMES TO THE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST 33-34 (19 13) [hereinafter STUBBS, SELECT 
CHARTERS]. In 1258, Henry III agreed with the barons to a set of reforms commonly labeled the 
"Provisions of Oxford ." See H.G. RICHARDSON & 0.0 . SAYLES, PARLIAMENTS AND GREAT 
COUNCILS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1-3 (1961). These provisions mandated holding three "parlia-
ments" per year, at which both the fifteen members of the king's council , and twelve ''honest men" 
elected by "the commonality" (presumab ly the barons), wou ld be pre sent. See PROVISIONS OF 
OXFQ;;:D, reprinted in STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS, supra at 387. 
192. English kings, at least as far back as Richard I, periodically issued summo ns for one or 
more counties to send representatives to appear before the king's court to discuss particular busi-
ness. See D. PASQUET, AN ESSAY ON THE ORIGINS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 223 (R.G .D. Laffan 
trans., 1925) . Beginning in 1265, English kings went beyond such isolated appearances by county 
representatives, and would, at times, summon all counties and towns to send representatives to a 
parliament. See Summons lo the Parliament of 1265, reprinted in STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS, su-
pra note 191, at 398 . Actually, writers often credit the "par liament" assembled by Simon de Mont-
fort during his strugg le with the king in 1264 as being the first "parliament" in England to include 
representatives of the towns and count ies. See MICHAEL A.R. GRAVES, THE PARLIAMENTS OF 
EARLY MODERN EUROPE 18 (2001). 
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county. 193 Eventually, the knights and the town representatives began to 
meet together in a chamber separately from the barons, thereby estab-
lishing what became the House of Commons, while the barons meeting 
together became the House of Lords. 194 
While the English parliament provides the most noted example of 
the development of European parliamentary institutions in the Middle 
Ages, England was not the only, or even likely the first, medieval Euro-
pean country to develop a parliament. Instead, many historians credit 
several Spanish kingdoms, such as Leon and Aragon-Catalonia, with es-
tablishing the first parliaments, which the kingdoms called "Cortes." 195 
In the end, however, the unification of Spain did not produce a unifica-
tion of the Cortes, and the power of the Cortes seems to have receded, 
following the fifteenth century, in the face of the growing authority of 
the Spanish monarchy. 196 
Aragon-Catalonian Cortes spread into Sicily, Sardinia and southern 
Italy, 197 while elsewhere in Italy, a variety of parliaments and similar as-
semblies came into being, beginning as early as the mid-thirteenth cen-
tury assemblies between nobles, clergy and town representatives con-
vened by the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick Il. 198 Ultimately, 
however, the medieval Italian parliaments waned in the face of the grow-
193. See Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, reprinted in STUBBS, SELECT 
CHARTERS, supra note 191, at 478. After 1327, English kings summoned knig hts and town repre-
sentatives to every parliament. See RICHARDSON & SAYLES, supra note 191, at 44. 
194. See PASQUET, supra note 192, at 224-30. 
195. See GRAVES, supra note 192, at 14-15. For example, in 1188, King Alfonso of Leon 
summoned representatives of the clergy, nobility and towns togethe r into a Cortes at which he 
agreed not to "make war or peace or treaty unless with the counsel of bishops, nobles and good 
men . . . . " Royal Engagements 10 a Cortes includin g Town Deputies at Leon, reprinted in BISSON, 
supra note 188, at 143. In the combined kingdom of Aragon and Catalonia, Cortes appear to have 
included representatives of towns as early as 1163 and 1214 (see Gaines Pos t, Roman Law and 
Early Representation in Spain and Italy, 1150-1250, 18 SPECULUM 211, 212, 219-21 (1943)), which 
is well before this occurred in England. In 1283, Peter Ill of Aragon confirmed, if not established, 
the constitutional power of the Aragon-Catalan Cortes, when he summoned togethe r clerics, nobles, 
and town representati ves for a Cortes at which he promised annual assemblies and no new law s 
without the assembly's assent. See GRAVES, supra note 192, at 15. 
196. See BRUCE LYON, Medieval Conslilutionalism: A Balance of Power, in STUDIES OF WEST 
EUROPEAN MEDIEVAL INSTITUTIONS, at 176 (1978). Bui see Jean Nicolas et al., The Monarchic 
Stale and Resislance, in RESISTANCE, REPRESENT A Tl ON, AND COMMUNITY, at 73- 74 (Peter Blick le 
ed., 1997) (challenging the traditional view that the Cortes declined as a consequence of the increa s-
ing power of the Spanish monarchs). 
197. See GRAVES, supra note 192, at 16. 
198. See LYON, supra note 196, at 168-69. 
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ing authoritarian power of the heads of the city-states, so that, by the 
height of the Renaissance, only three Italian parliaments remained. 199 
In medieval Germany, parliament-like assemblies occurred both on 
a national or imperial level (a Reichstag or diet) and on the level of the 
principalities (a Landtage). 200 The extent to which the Reichstag, with a 
few historic exceptions, constituted a real parliament is in doubt, how-
ever, not because of too much sovereign control, but, ironically, because 
of too little. As the Holy Roman Emperor became increasingly power-
less, control shifted to the local princes and towns acting individually 
rather then through the Reichstag. 201 Hence, the Landtage, which were 
assemblies of local nobles and town representatives in a principality, 
constituted the more significant representative assemblies in medieval 
Germany. These assemblies frequently played a role of arbitrator in re-
solving dynastic disputes involving either succession to the throne or 
partition of territory, and often used the occasion to extract concessions, 
such as control over taxes. 202 
French assemblies with participants from the nobility, the clergy 
and the towns became known as the Estates, as they included representa-
tives of the three estates (or classes) which, under the view of the time, 
comprised medieval society.203 As with medieval Germany, medieval 
France had both national assemblies, the Estates General, 204 and local 
assemblies, the provincial Estates, and, as in Germany, the local assem-
blies became the more important. In France, however, this phenomenon 
stemmed from the growing power of the monarchy over the local lords, 
rather than vice versa. French kings (perhaps fearing the example set by 
the growing power of the English parliaments) by and large declined to 
call for Estates General, and, instead, sought consent to increased aid 
199. See H.G. Koenigsberger, The Parliament of Piedmont During the Renaissance, 1460-
/560, l l ETUDES 69, 70 (1952). 
200. SeeLYON,supranote 196,at 166. 
201. Id. at 166-67. 
202. In the late fourteenth century, a strong Landtage emerged in the principalities of Hesse, 
Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg, and Bohemia. See GRAVES, supra note l 92, at 23-24. 
203. See JOSEPH BILLIOUD, LES ETATS DE BOURGOGNE Aux XIVE ET XVE SIECLES 328-29 
(l 922). Interestingly, France also had institutions labeled "parlements," but these institutions were 
composed of magistrates and their function was judicial. See Nicolas et al., supra note l 96, at 78-80. 
204. Historians generally consider the Estates General to begin with the assembly convened in 
Paris in 1302 by the French king, Phillip the Fair, who was seeking support in his dispute with the 
Pope. In order to obtain the necessary revenues, Phillip went beyond the traditional assembly of 
lords who owed a direct feudal obligation to the king, and also summoned representatives of villas 
(towns) to appear with the full power to consent to grant aid. See CHARLES H. MCILAWIN, Medieval 
Estates, 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY 683-87 ( 1932). 
2004) ORIGINS OF THE CORPORA TE BOARD 133 
from the provincial Estates. 205 At the same time, French nobles did not 
combine to force the king to call national assemblies, as had the English 
barons. 206 As a result, Estates in provinces negotiated over and con-
sented to taxes, and played what turned into an ever-decreasing role as a 
constitutional check on the growing power of the French monarchy. 207 
2. Parliamentary Assemblies and Corporate Boards 
To what extent did these medieval assemblies and parliaments in-
spire, or else reflect common thinking with, the earliest corporate 
boards? One difficulty with answering this question arises from the fact 
that historians have engaged in seemingly endless interpretation, revised 
thinking and debate as to the nature, origins and impact of these medie-
val assemblies and parliaments. 208 For example, whi le a pioneering his-
torian in the field, William Stubbs, argued that the essential elements of 
a parliament, as recognized in late thirteenth century England, were: (1) 
the existence of a central or national assembly; (2) that included repre-
sentatives of all classes of people (nobility and commons); (3) the 
classes being present or having freely elected their representatives; and 
(4) which possessed powers of taxation, legislation and general political 
deliberation, 209 the legal historian, Frederic Maitland, argued that the 
core of a parliament, as understood in the thirteenth century, was a ses-
sion of the king's council, and that much of the business of a parliament 
was judicial (hearing petitions and resolving grievances and the like).210 
205. See ROBERT FAWTIER, Par/ement d'Angle1erre et Etats Generaux de France au Mayen 
Age, in COMPTES RENDUS DEL' ACADEMIE DES INSCRIPTIONS 276-84 (1953). 
206. See LYON, supra note 196, at 173-75. 
207. See Gustave Dupont-Ferrier , De Quelques Problemes Historiques Relatif.5 aux Etats 
Provinciaux, J. DES SAVANTS 315 (1928). There were a variety of assemblies and parliaments in 
medieval European kingdoms beyond those in England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France. See 
GRAVES, supra note 192, at 14-25. One of these, that in Brabrant (now part of Belgium), bears spe-
cial mention. In a series of charters, culminating in the so-called Joyeuse En tree ( often referred to as 
the Belgian Magna Carta), the dukes ofBrabrant (who were in serious financial trouble) granted to a 
council composed of nobles and representatives of wealthy towns, control over war, alliances, ducal 
appointments, legislation and taxes. See LYON, supra note 196, at 179-80. 
208. For a good overview of the principal streams of thought involved in these interpretations, 
revisions and debates, see BISSON, supra note 188, at 1-5. 
209. See generally STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 189. 
210. See fREDERJC w. MAITLAND, RECORDS OF THE PARLIAMENT HOLDEN AT 
WESTMINISTER. ix-xxi (1893). Historians writing more recently have continued this debate. Compare 
RICHARDSON & SAYLES, supra note 191, at 2 (stating that the function of thirteenth century English 
parliaments was essentially judicial) , with BERTIE WILKINSON, STUDIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTE NTH CENTURIES 14-29, 50-54 (2d ed. 1952) (stating 
that the function of medieval English parliaments was essentially to make political decisions). 
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Historians have propounded various theories as to why parliaments 
developed in Europe in the late twelfth through fourteenth centuries. 
Some suggest that such assemblies were a natural outgrowth of medieval 
ideas concerning the need for consultation and consensus decision-
making, which held that both custom and common law required the king 
to consult with, and obtain the acquiescence of, the broader community 
when making decisions.211 Other historians emphasize the Roman and 
Canon Law doctrines of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur 
("what touches all is to be approved by all"), and plena potestas (the 
"full power" of a representative to bind a corporate body to decisions) as 
providing the legal basis for the development of medieval parliaments. 212 
Many historians see fiscal needs providing a critical impetus for the de-
velopment of parliaments , as growing demands for revenue increasingly 
forced kings to seek consent from assemblies for taxes.213 Yet other his-
torians argue that parliaments may have been an outgrowth of military 
assemblies in which the king sought counsel regarding, and support for, 
decisions regarding war. 2 14 The traditional history of the English parlia-
ment, as recited earlier, emphasizes the demands of nobility for consulta-
tion as providing an impetus for the development of parliaments; but 
other historians argue that parliaments were a burden imposed by the 
kings, much like typical attitudes toward a present-day summons for jury 
duty.215 A theory often associated with German historians views medie-
val parliaments as an outgrowth of medieval corporatism- not in the 
sense of business corporations, but in the sense that medieval society 
was organized into various collectives or corporate groups (churches , 
guilds, towns, etc.), each one of which possessed various rights and 
privileges. Under this theory, medieval parliaments developed as a com-
promise through which the king dealt with the representatives of the 
more powerful corporate groups in society.216 Of course, many of these 
21 1. See, e.g. , REYNOLDS, sup ra note 190, at 302-305. This cu stom and common law may , in 
turn, have been a produ ct of a fusion between Germani c tribal trad ition s and Christ ian ideas regard-
ing communi ty. See infra notes 3 14- 16 and accompan ying text. 
2 12. See Br ian Tierney, Medieva l Canon Law and Western Constitutionalism, 52 CATH. HIST. 
REV. I , 13 ( 1966 ). 
2 13. See JOHN 8 . MORRALL, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN M EDIEVAL TIMES 60 (1962). 
2 14. See Tho mas N . Bisso n, The Military Origins of Medieval Representa tion, 71 AM. HIST. 
REV. 1199 (l 966) . 
2 15. See PASQUET, supra note 192, at 223-3 0. 
216. See Emile Lou sse, Parlementarisme ou corporatisme? Les origines des assemblees 
d 'etats , 4 Revu e Histor ique de Droi t Francai s et Etranger 684-706 ( 1935). Just as there are different 
theories for the orig ins of medie val parlia me nts, there are also differ ent explan ations as to why the 
English parliament surv ived when other med ieval Europ ean parliaments withered. Wh ile some 
nineteenth century historians att ribu ted the surv iva l of the English pa rliament to innate characteris -
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theories as to the nature, origins and impact of medieval European par-
liaments are not mutually inconsistent, but rather, much like the blind 
persons' descriptions of the elephant, are simply emphasizing different 
aspects of a multi-faceted phenomenon. 
Needless to say, there is not the space here to explore all of the 
varying theories and debates about medieval European parliaments. In-
stead, what is important for purposes of this Article is the extent to 
which the use of boards in early business corporations resulted from imi-
tating medieval European parliaments, or, more likely, whether the un-
derlying ideas that produced medieval European parliaments also pro-
moted the use of boards in early business corporations . In the absence of 
direct evidence of linkage, we must examine the similarities and differ-
ences in practices and concepts between the two institutions. At first 
glance, there is an obvious similarity between early corporate boards and 
medieval parliaments in that both seemingly involve collective decision-
making by a representative group. Yet, on closer scrutiny, it is not sim-
ple to say whether medieval parliaments embodied all, or even mo.st, of 
the underlying concepts discussed earlier in this Article217 which define 
the board-centered model of corporate governance; i.e., decision-making 
by a group of peers, elected to represent (rather than themselves consti-
tuting all of) the owners, and who have the ultimate authority over the 
executive officers. 
To begin with, the mere assembly of nobles, clergy and town repre-
sentatives with the king did not mean that there was collective or peer 
group decision-making in the medieval "parliaments." After all, even the 
most autocratic medieval monarch might wish to call an assembly of no-
bles, clergy and perhaps town representatives in order to announce deci-
sions or as an audience for major events in the kingdom ( coronations or 
the like). Alternate ly, monarchs with absolute authority might seek ad-
vice from, and the support of, a council or a broader assembly, but nev-
ertheless retain power to make the ultimate decision. Nevertheless, while 
tics of the English people, see, e.g., STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 189, at 1-11, 
more recent historians find the explanation in a balance of power between the English kings, nobles , 
and towns , which prevented the withering of parliaments at the hands of absolute monarchs (as later 
occurred in France and Spain) on the one hand , or the fracturing of parliaments as a result of con-
flicts between overly powerful local lords and towns (as occurred in Germany and Italy) on the 
other hand . See, e.g., LYON , supra note 196 at, 157-183. Geography that was not too large (as in 
France), or too small (as in various city states), also may have given the English parliament a 
"Goldilock s" like survival advantage. See, e.g., Robert Fawtier, Parlement d'Angleterr e et £tat s 
Generaux de France au Mayen Age , in COMPES·RENDUS DE L' ACADEMIE DES INSCRfPTIONS ET 
BELLES·LEITRE S 276-84 (1953). 
217 . See supra notes 8-25. 
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many medieval assemblies-even ones to which a medieval chronicler 
might attach the label "parliament" or an equivalent term-no doubt fit 
within these two possibilities, many medieval parliaments did entail real 
collective or peer group decision-making. 218 For example, it would not 
seem to have made much sense for the English barons to press the king 
to agree in Magna Carta to obtain consent of "common counsel" to 
"aid," (taxes) or to agree in the Provisions of Oxford to hold three par-
liaments per year,219 if such assemblies could only give non-binding ad-
vice to the king, but otherwise must approve or carry out the king's deci-
sions. Other assemblies for which there seems to be good evidence of 
real decision-making power include the council of nobles and town rep-
resentatives in Brabant, which had control over war, alliances, ducal ap-
pointments, legislation and taxes; the Aragon-Catalan Cortes, which had 
a veto over new laws; and the Landtage of some of the German princi-
palities.220 Beyond the evidence of specific practice, the Roman or 
Canon Law doctrine of quad omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur (what 
touches all is to be approved by all) would not seem to be met by a par-
liament that had no choice about consenting to the king's decisions.221 
Whether the concept of representation embodied in the board-
centered model of corporate governance (that shareholders elect a group 
of directors, rather than manage the firm themselves) is anything like the 
"representative" nature of medieval parliaments is an even more com-
plex question. The complexity arises from the different meanings encap-
sulated within the overall idea of representation. At its simplest level, 
both corporate boards and medieval parliaments are "representative" in 
the sense that a smaller group makes decisions binding upon a larger 
group, instead of having the entire body of shareholders (in the corpora-
tion), or the entire body politic (in the kingdom) make decisions. Indeed, 
many historians attach great significance to the Roman or Canon Law 
2 18. See A NTONIO MARONGTU, MEDIEVAL PARLIAMENT S: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 45-67 
(1968) 
2 19. See supra note I 91. 
220. See supra notes I 95-207 and accompanying text. 
221. But see MORRALL , sup ra note 213, at 65. The fact that many medieval parliaments exer-
cised real collective decision-making authority does not necessarily mean that they operated through 
formal votes and majority rule , as would a modem legislature. Instead, medieval political philoso-
phy typically placed a high value on consensus-based decisions. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 
3 I 9. Still, this fact might not distingui sh medieval politi cal thought from current board-centered 
corporate governance , since corpora te boards also typically operate, in practice if not in law, 
through consensus- based decisions. See Manning , supra, note 34, at I 483. In any event, as remain s 
true both in legislatures and corporate boards today, the theore tical right to refuse consent does not 
mean that , as a matter of practical politics, a board or legislative body will say no to a strong or 
popular chief executive. 
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doctrine of plena potestas (the full power of a representative to bind a 
corporate body to decisions) in turning feudal assemblies into parlia-
ments. It was through this doctrine that representatives of the towns 
bound the towns to the decisions (particularly regarding taxes) of the 
parliaments, rather than the king having to negotiate tax collection or the 
like with each town. 222 On the other hand, the concept of representation 
seemingly embodied in plena potestas, as well as encompassed within 
the corporatist view of medieval society, was that individuals repre-
sented particular groups-for example, the burgher represented the par-
ticular town that sent him-rather than the whole kingdom.223 This is 
different from the representative capacity of the board members of the 
early English business corporations, who typically did not represent any 
particular group of owners. 224 In fact, this difference in the nature of rep-
resentation between legislatures (in which members represent particular 
states or districts) and corporate boards (at least in the absence of articles 
creating classified boards) carries through to the present time.225 Yet an-
other interpretation within the concept of representation stems from the 
fact that the modern mind tends to equate "representation" with democ-
ratic election, and, both today, and in the early business corporations, 
shareholders generally have elected members of the board.226 By con-
trast, despite the romantic views of earlier historians like Stubbs, town 
222. See MORRALL, supra note 213, at 64-65. 
223. See Summonses to the Parliament of November I 295, supra note 193 (stating that the 
knights sent to parliament are to have "full and sufficient power for themselves and the community 
of aforesaid shire," and the citizens and burghers sent to parliament are to have such power "for 
themselves and the community of cities and boroughs separately," to do the business of parliament 
( emphasis added). 
224. Actually, this seems to have been more true in English versus continental European cor-
porations , as witnessed by a comparison of the English East India Company (which, for most of its 
history , seems to have had a board elected at large by all voting members) with the Dutch East India 
Company-whose board consisted of a defined number of representatives for each of the various 
"chambers" (merchant groups in different Dutch cities) which made up the company. See supra text 
accompanying notes 181-84. It is also worth noting that the 1505 charter of the Company of Mer-
chant Adventurers called for the election of persons of "divers (sic] fellowships ." See supra text 
accompanying note 175. This may suggest an intent that the board members, even if elected at large, 
should come from, and thereby represent, different factions or groups within the Merchant Adven-
turers. 
225. There is some difference in this regard , however, between Anglo-American corporations, 
and those Getman and other continental European corporations that operate under a system of co-
detennination in which the supervisory board has representatives of the shareholders and represen-
tatives of labor. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 8-14. Boards of early corporations, however , provide 
some noteworthy exceptions to shareholder election of directors . As discussed earlier, the initial 
charter of the London and the Plymouth Companies empowered the king to name the members of 
the governing council, while "assistants" on the governing board of the Eastland Company retained 
their positions on good behavior. See supra text accompanying notes I 05-15. 
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citizens may not have elected, in any democratic sense, their representa-
tives to medieval parliaments. 227 Indeed, there may have been little de-
mand for democratic elections at a time when people naturally assumed 
that older, wealthier and more powerful members of the community 
should speak for the community, 228 and when acting as a representative 
to parliament was a significant unpaid burden.229 Gradually, more and 
more residents of the counties and towns gained the right to vote in the 
election of representatives to the English Commons; yet it was to be cen-
turies before such elections typically involved any choice between com-
peting candidates. 230 On the other hand, the lack of competing candi-
dates remains typical of corporate board elections today.231 
The most striking difference between medieval parliaments and 
corporate boards, however, may go to relations with the chief executive. 
While the corporate board of directors is at least theoretically supreme 
over the chief executive, the question of parliaments' supremacy versus 
the kings' arose in centuries of European disputes 232 ( of which the Eng-
lish Civil War constitutes one dramatic example). Indeed , the relation-
ship of medieval monarch with parliament (or the equivalent assembly) 
provided the most visible, but by no means the only, example of an un-
derlying tension running throughout medieval political thinking-this 
being how to resolve the value medieval society placed on hierarchy and 
respect for authority with the value it placed on collective decision-
making.233 Hence, even if a medieval parliament had real collective de-
cision-making, as opposed to solely advisory, power (for instance to re-
fuse a request for aid or taxes), this does not mean that such a parliament 
had the same ultimate power presently entailed in the board-centered 
model of corporate governance. Most especially, there would appear to 
be a major difference between the power of the corporate board to select 
and remove the chief executive, and the medieval parliaments ' general 
lack of power to do the same with the king.234 Still, this difference may 
227. See REYNOLDS, supra note I 90, at 310. 
228. See id. at 251. 
229. See generally, e.g., PASQUET, supra note 192. 
230. See Nicolas et al., supra note 196, at 120-21 (describing growth of the franchi se, but the 
lack of choice between candidates, in elections to the English Commons from the fifteenth through 
seventeenth centuries) . 
23 1. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66. 
232. See OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 30-48 (Frederick William 
Maitland trans., 1938). 
233. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 51-52. 
234. See MARCIA L. COLISH, MEDIEVAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL 
TRADJTTON 400-1400, at 348-49 ( 1997). But see GIERKE, supra note 232. at 45-46 (discussing me-
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be less dramatic than one initially might assume. As discussed earlier, 235 
the boards in the early corporations typically lacked the power to select 
or remove the corporation ' s governor (whom typically the members di-
rectly elected). Moreover, medieval assemblies apparently had a say in 
selecting the king on a number of instances. 236 For example, some histo-
rians claim that Anglo-Saxon kings required the consent of the witan 
( council of advisors) to choose a successor, 237 and, as stated earlier, 
German parliaments arbitrated succession disputes between competing 
claimants to the throne. 
All in all, even though there are important differences between cor-
porate boards and medieval parliaments, there are enough similarities to 
suggest a common conceptual heritage based upon ideas of collective 
decision-making by representatives of a broader community. This is well 
illustrated by the invocation of the Roman or Canon Law doctrines of 
quad omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur (what touches all is to be ap-
proved by all) and plena potestas (the full power of a representative to 
bind a corporate body) as the legal basis for medieval European parlia-
ments . Significantly, these two Roman or Canon Law doctrines were by 
no means solely, or even particularly, applicable to parliaments and 
kingdoms. Rather , they originated in very different contexts. Medieval 
Canon Law jurists and scholars originally developed the doctrine of 
quad omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur from a Roman law technical 
rule involving co-tutorship into a rationale for allowing lay representa-
tives to attend General Councils of the Church, 238 while plena potestas 
originally involved the power of agents to represent corporations in civil 
suits. 239 The transposition of these two doctrines into a legal basis for 
medieval parliaments then occurred when summonses for attendance at 
medieval parliaments (which lawyers trained in Canon Law probably 
drafted) started invoking the two principles in describing the purpose 
and nature of the representation commanded. 240 Yet, there is no reason to 
suppose that doctrines so conveniently transposed into a legal basis for 
dieval jurist s' claims that representative assemblies might remove a sovere ign who neglected his 
duties). 
235. See supra text accompanying note s 101-09. 
236. See GIERKE, supra note 232, at 42. 
237. See SIMON SCHAMA, 2 A HISTORY OF BRITAIN : THE WAR S OF THE BRITISH 1603-1776, at 
80 (2000) . 
238. See gene rally Tierney , supra note 212. 
239. See Post, supra note 195, at 211. 
240. See Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, supra note 193 (reciting the doc-
trine that "what touche s all is to be approved by all" in se tting forth the purpose of the summons, 
and commanding that the county and town representati ves have ''fu ll power" to do the busines s of 
the parliament). 
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representative parliaments might not also serve, even without express 
restatement , the same function for the boards of early business corpora-
tions. Indeed, the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers 
grants the board "full power and authority" to rule and govern over the 
merchants. 241 This suggests a common legal basis for corporate boards 
and medieval parliaments, since both institutions served as vehicles to 
obtain the consent required by the doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab om-
nibus approbetur through representatives with full power (plena potes-
tas) to give the consent on behalf of the broader community. 
It is also worth keeping in mind that some of the apparent differ-
ences between medieval parliaments and corporate boards may wane 
when one compares medieval parliaments to boards in the early, rather 
than in today's, corporations. For example, while the judicial function of 
medieval parliaments (for whom, as mentioned above, a significant, if 
not primary, task was resolving legal disputes) seems very different from 
the role of a modern corporate board , much of the function of the board 
of the Company of Merchant Adventurers was, as discussed earlier, 242 to 
resolve mercantile disputes involving members of the company. 
B. Town Councils 
Town councils constitute a second example of medieval European 
collective decision-making by representative bodies, and, indeed, pro-
vide an example that is highly relevant in searching for the conceptual 
origins of the corporate board of directors. There is stronger evidence 
that the use of governing boards in the early corporations was either an 
imitation of town councils, or at least based upon a common intellectual 
foundation, than is available to establish such linkage with medieval par-
liaments. Moreover, since the creation of medieval European town 
councils often constituted a departure from either a hierarchical govern-
ance of the municipality solely by executive officials, at one extreme, or 
a sort of direct democratic governance under which all enfranchised 
members of the community participated, at the other extreme, under-
standing the motivations behind the use of town councils might provide 
insight into why the early corporations chose to employ a board struc-
ture, rather than leaving a chief executive in charge or following the 
partnership style system of all owners managing the company. 
241. See CA WSTON & KEANE, supra note 116, at 250. 
242. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Growth of Town Councils 
Across W estem Europe during the Middle Ages, representative 
town councils became a common feature of municipal governance . 243 As 
with medieval parliaments, the English experience provides a noted ex-
ample. The first documented municipal council in medieval English his-
tory is found in Ipswich in the year 1200.244 On May 25, 1200, King 
John granted a charter to Ipswich. 245 The Ipswich charter empowered the 
town to elect two bailiffs and four coroners, who then became the execu-
tive officials of the town.246 For our purposes, however, what is most 
important is something that was not in the charter. According to a 
chronicle apparently made by the town clerk, 247 on June 29, 1200, an as-
sembly of the town occurred in the churchyard of St. Mary's Tower in 
order to carry out the election of the bailiffs and coroners as commanded 
by the charter. After completing this election, the gathered townsfolk 
then decided that "henceforth there should be in the said borough twelve 
sworn chief portmen, 248 as there are in other free boroughs of England, 
and that they should have full power, for themselves and for the whole 
town, to govern and maintain the said borough and all its liberties, to 
render judgments of the town and also to keep, ordain, and do in the said 
243. See FRITZ RORIG, THE MEDIEVAL TOWN 26 (1967). 
244. See HEATHER SWANSON, MEDIEVAL BRITISH TOWNS 80 (1999) . This is not to suggest 
that Ipswich was a particularly important or innovative burg, even in medieval times. Rather, lps-
wich 's prime place in the history of English municipal government is the result of its good fortune 
in making a chronicle of the relevant events and in having that record survive the subsequent centu-
ries. 
245. See CARL STEPHENSON, BOROUGH AND TOWN, A STUDY OF URBAN ORIGINS IN 
ENGLAND 174 (1933) . In large part, the Ipsw ich charter is a fairly typical example of the charters 
granted by John and other kings to borough s in the Middl e Ages. Indeed , a charter granted earlier 
the same year to Northampton apparently served as the model for the Ipswich charter, as well as for 
the charters granted to Gloucester, Lincoln and Shrewsbury. Id. at 174 n.6 . The Ipsw ich charter 
granted the burgesses of the town a "fee fann ," in other words, the right to collect their own taxes 
and remit to the king his share, as opposed to having a royal appointee (a "reeve") collect the taxes 
(and presumably keep a bit for himself). The charter also granted certain other rights and privileges 
that had the effect of removin g the burgesses of Ipswich from feudal status, such as exemptions 
from toll s, and the right to try disputes in their own courts rather than in the cou rt of the local noble. 
See COLIN PLATT, THE ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TO\\IN 130 (1976). 
246. The bailiffs had the function of the former reeve, while the coroners, who had broader 
duties than entailed in our current notion of the office, handled judicial and various other matter s 
pertaining to the crown, and were also responsible for supervising the bailiffs. See STEPHENSON, 
supra note 245, at l 75. 
247. There has been some argument about the authenticity of this chronicle as being , in fact, a 
contemporary account, as opposed to a later interpolation. Id. at 177 ( discussing the basis for the 
challenge and rejecting the argument). 
248. The word "port" at this time could be used synonymously with borough, so that, for ex-
ample, the borough court was often referred to as the "portmanmoot." See SWANSON, supra note 
244, at 75. 
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borough whatever should be done for the well-being and honor of the 
said town. "249 
While we only have the word of the burgesses of Ipswich for the 
assertion that town councils were already the norm among free boroughs 
of England in 1200, it was not long before other documented examples 
of English town councils appeared. 250 The evidence shows that among 
English free boroughs after the twelfth century, a town council of twelve 
or twenty-four members was the norm. 251 
Just as the case with medieval parliaments, England was not the 
first medieval European country to have widespread town councils. 
Rather, documents show increasing use of such councils already occur-
ring in other medieval European countries during the century before the 
events at Ipswich. Not surprisingly in view of their rapid growth, Italian 
medieval cities provide some of the earliest evidence of the use of town 
councils.252 In the twelfth century, groups composed of so-called "con-
suls"-typically numbering from four to twelve, or a multiple 
thereof 53-governed many Italian cities.254 Because of continued strife 
249. See STEPHENSON, supra note 245, at 175 (translating from the original Latin). 
250. See PLATT, supra note 245, at 132 (stating that records reflect the election in 1206 of a 
council of twenty-four for London). 
251. See STEPHENSON, supra note 245, at 174 n.4. Later, as municipal governance in England 
evolved into the sixteenth century, a bicameral council system replaced the single council in many 
English cities. This commonly entailed an inner council of twelve or twenty-four members (that was 
often self-perpetuating, rather than elected), and an elected outer council of some greater number 
(often a multiple of twelve). See PETER CLARK & PAUL SLACK, ENGLISH TOWNS IN TRANSITlON 
1500-1700,at2 9, 128-29( 1976). 
252. There are suggestions of the existence of some sort of town counci I in Pisa by I 081, when 
the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV, issued a charte r to Pisa, promising various liberties, and agree-
ing not to appoint any marquis in Tuscany unless twelve representatives of Pisa gave their consent 
in an assembly summoned by the town bells; albeit it is unclear whether these twelve persons were a 
permanent council. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 169. 
253. See JOHN H. MUNDY & PETER RIESENBERG, THE MEDIEVAL TOWN 50 (1958). 
254. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 169-70. At first, the local bishop or viscount (who rep-
resented the Holy Roman emperor) appointed these consuls. see SUMMERFIELD BALDWIN, 
BUSINESS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 52 (1937), but eventually they became either self-perpetuating or 
else elected by a body of the leading citizens of the city. See RORIG, supra note 243, at 26. For ex-
ample, in Florence during the twelfth century, the assembly which elected the consuls was known as 
the "parlamentum." See R.W. CARSTENS, THE MEDIEVAL ANTECEDENTS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 
18 (1992). As the Italian cities developed and internal dissension grew, their municipal governments 
evolved. Whereas the consuls seemed to have performed representative, executive and judicial func-
tions, see REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 170, the new municipal constitutions often reposed the 
executive function in a single office, the "podesta," see JAMES W. THOMPSON, ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES (300-1300) 784 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter THOMPSON, 
ECONOMIC AND SOClAL HISTORY], while the representat ive function might lie with a combination 
of a twelve or twenty-four member lesser council, and broader assemblies. See ANTONY BLACK, 
GUILDS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM THE TWELFTH CENTURY TO 
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between various classes and factions, however, Italian cities, after a pe-
riod of increasingly democratic governance during the thirteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries, often ended up in the Renaissance governed 
by magistrates and princes with dictatorial powers.255 
In the north, municipalities in Flanders also provide very early evi-
dence of the use of town councils; albeit, this apparent precociousness 
may simply reflect an accident of greater documentation. A succession 
dispute in 1127 over who would become the count of Flanders has left 
for later historians a written charter granted to Saint-Omer, the provi-
sions in which might be typical of the rights of towns in Flanders at the 
time. In addition to confirming the burgesses of the town's exemptions 
from obligations of feudalism, the Saint-Omer charter, significantly for 
our purposes, grants the burgesses the right to be tried by their own 
"echevins." 256 While this suggests solely a judicial function for the so-
called "echevins," it appears from later evidence that during the twelfth 
century in Flanders the echevins had become a locally elected commis-
sion, normally numbering twelve persons, who handled all of the execu-
tive, as well as judicial, governance functions of the town. 257 Such coun-
cils with combined judicial and executive functions- sometimes called 
echevins and sometimes called "jures"----can be found governing towns 
throughout northern France by the middle to late twelfth century, while 
in the south of France, similar institutions , but whose members pos-
sessed the Italian influenced name of consuls, were in charge of the 
foremost towns by 1150.258 In the end, however , just as the growing 
autocratic control by town princes doomed most Italian parliaments and 
town councils alike, the growing power of the French monarchy caused 
a decline in the power of both the Estates and the French town councils. 
By the middle of the fifteenth century, royal officials were taking over 
control from the consular government of the town burgesses in 
France.259 
THE PRESENT 48 (1984). These constitutions also sometimes adopted fairly elaborate schemes for 
selecting members of the councils. See MUNDY & RIESENBERG, supra note 253, at 79-80. 
255. See MUNDY & RlESENBERG, supra note 253, at 79, 82-83. 
256. STEPHENSON, supra note 245, at 34-35 . 
257. Id. at 37. 
258. Id. at 40-41. There were eight consuls in the governing group for Avignon, twelve in Mar-
seilles, and twenty-four in Toulouse . See THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 784. 
259. See R.H. HILTON, ENGLISH AND FRENCH TOWNS IN FEUDAL SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 51 (1992). 
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During the twelfth and thirteen centuries, the town council contin-
ued to spread throughout Western Europe.260 The end result was that 
town councils, commonly numbering twelve or some multiple thereof, 
became a prevalent feature of medieval European municipal govern-
ment. 261 
2. Town Councils and Corporate Boards 
The earlier comparison of medieval European parliaments and cor-
porate boards produced some, but admittedly only mixed, evidence of 
imitation or a common conceptual underpinning. By contrast, there is 
much stronger evidence of such commonality between early corporate 
boards and medieval European town councils. To begin with, medieval 
municipalities were often "corporations" themselves, and, hence, would 
have provided a logical template for governance provisions in the char-
ters of the early trading companies. Actually, medieval towns were cor-
porations under a couple of different meanings of the term-b oth of 
which, in fact, are significant in suggesting a linkage between town 
councils and the early trading company boards. 
The definition of a "corporation" that is more familiar to the lawyer 
is that it is a fictitious legal entity or person, created by an act of the 
state, which possesses rights such as the ability to hold property and to 
sue and be sued, and can continue to exist despite the death of its mem-
bers. 262 Many English towns, starting in the fifteenth century, sought and 
received charters making them corporations in this sense.263 The typical 
explanation for this action given by historians focuses on certain practi-
cal advantages that resulted from such status-especially, the ability of a 
town to avoid application of the legislation on mortmain by becoming a 
royally chartered corporation empowered to hold property. 264 The same 
concerns with owning property despite the legislation on mortmain also 
inspired a number of English guilds to seek royal grants of corporate 
charters at this time.265 Hence , it is entirely plausible that lawyers draft-
260. For example, presumably copy ing from Italy and France , members of Germa n tow n cou n-
cils during the thirteenth century began to refer to themselves as consuls. See REYNO LDS, supra 
note 190, at l 74. 
261. Id. at 191. 
262 . See Tmstees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, l 7 U.S . 5 18, 636 (18 19). 
263 . See PLATT, supra note 245, at 142. 
264. Id. at 143-44. The fact that the rapid growth in corpora te charte rs for English tow ns began 
after the extension, in 1391, of mortmain legisl ation to reac h towns and guilds supports this exp la-
nation. 
265. See SUSAN R EYNO LDS, IDEAS AND SOLIDARITIES OF MEDIEVA L LA ITY ch . VI, pp. 12- 13 
(1995) (hereinafter REYNOLDS, }DEAS]. 
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ing charters for towns, guilds, and, later, trading companies , would have 
borrowed ideas, including with respect to governance , from the charter 
of one type of corporation in order to include in the charter of another 
type- particularly insofar as one aspect of the trend toward formal town 
incorporation was the inclusion in the new charters of governance provi-
sions formalizing and refining the reliance on town councils. 266 
There is another meaning of corporation, however, which would 
have encompassed more towns, at an earlier stage, and could have had 
an even more profound linkage to the governance of early trading com-
panies. This meaning comes from a sort of realist theory of the corpora-
tion often associated with German legal philosophers. 267 Under this ap-
proach, a corporation is not some fictitious legal person created by an act 
of the state, but rather the law's recognition that some groups can engage 
in such a degree of collective action and have such a collective identity 
that the collective itself starts to exist as an independent reality, and, as 
such, possesses rights and liabilities. Medieval corporations in this sense 
included guilds, universities , the Church or some of its components , and, 
of importance here, towns. 268 We encountered this notion before as one 
explanation of the development of medieval parliaments -s pecifically , 
that such parliaments arose as a mechanism through which representa-
tives of the more powerful corporations dealt with the monarch.269 While 
this consequence of the corporate nature of medieval society impacted 
political institutions external to the corporations themselves, the corpo-
rate nature of medieval society could also have had an impact on the na-
ture of political or governing institutions within the corporations . This 
internal impact, which, if present, would establish an extraordinarily 
strong link between town councils and corporate boards , arises from the 
possibility that the widespread existence of corporate collectives in me-
dieval Europe produced overarching ideas about the governance of cor-
porate collectives, no matter in what context the collective arose-town, 
guild, or trading company-and that these overarching ideas naturally 
led to the introduction of councils and boards. 270 We shall return to the 
266. Id. at ch. XIII, pp. 49-50 (giving the examp le of Gloucester , which adopted a charter fol-
lowing the "London model " of a mayor, a council of aldermen, and a broad er common counc il); 
CLARK & SLACK, supra note 251, at 128 (asserting the new charters were designed to promote con-
trol by the oligarchy) . 
267. See Frederic William Maitland, Translator's Introduction, POLITICAL THEORIE S OF THE 
MIDDLE AGE xxv-xxv ii ( 1900). 
268. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 18-24. 
269. See supra text accompanyi ng note 216. 
270. One example of this transposition of governance ideas between types of corporatio ns so as 
to create an overarching ideology of corporate (in the broadest sense of the word) governa nce, is 
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prospect shortly when considering why medieval European towns devel-
oped councils. 
In addition to providing a logical source for governance ideas for 
the early trading corporations, medieval town councils had a practical 
linkage to such corporations. This linkage comes through the merchant 
guilds. As discussed above, 271 the early trading companies (as exempli-
fied by the Company of Merchant Adventurers) were in large measure 
little more than merchant guilds, which then morphed into the joint stock 
companies. Guild leadership, in tum, substantially overlapped with 
membership on medieval town councils. Once again, we can thank the 
Ipswich chronicler for convenient evidence of this relationship. The 
Ipswich charter, like many similar charters, granted the burgesses the 
right to have a guild merchant. 272 The Ipswich chronicler relates how, 
during the course of their organizing assemblies, the Ipswich townsfolk 
selected one of the twelve chief portmen to be the alderman ( or head) of 
this guild, and named three other chief portmen, as well as one of the 
coroners, to be the four assistants to the alderman. 273 In many instances, 
the overlap between town council and the leadership of the merchant 
guild went beyond common members. In Cologne, the managing com-
mittee of the merchant guild became the town's first govemment, 274 
while, in Calais, the governing council of the Merchants of the Staple 
ran the town for two years. 275 Florentine town councils for some time 
were composed of representatives selected by the various guilds. 276 In 
found in the works of the medieval jurist , Bartolus. Dealing with the issue of whether consent for 
action by a city required an assembly of the populace, Bartolus applied the earlier work of the me-
dieval scholar of Canon Law, Hostiensis, who wrote that the consent required of the members of 
ecclesiastical colleges could only be given in a public assembly. See BLACK, supra note 254 , at 84. 
271. See supra text accompanying notes 163, 176-77. 
272. HILTON, supra note 259, at 93. Along similar lines, the 1127 charter for Saint-Omer con-
tains various provisions supporting the town's guild . See STEPHENSON, supra note 245, at 35. The 
charter granted to Gloucester in the same year as Ipswich's provides an interesting variation. Instead 
of granting the various liberties to the town's burge sses, who are then empowered to have a guild 
merchant , the Gloucester charter , for the most part, simply granted the liberties associated with a 
borough franchise to the "burgesses of Gloucester of the gild merchant, " i.e., to the memb ers of the 
guild. See HILTON, supra note 259, at 93 . 
273. See HILTON, supra note 259 , at 93. Even more dramatically , a comparison of a mid-
thirteenth century membership list of the Leicester town council , with the membership list at the 
same time of the governing council of Leicester's merchant guild (both with twenty-four members) , 
shows that they were composed of virtually the same person s. PLATT, supra note 245 , at 133. Dur-
ing the sixteenth century , many of the English municipal leaders were closely identified with the 
Merchant Adventurers , see CLARK & SLACK, supra note 251, at 129, whose charter , as discussed 
above , helped establish the use of a board among English trading companies. 
274. BLACK, supra note 254 , at 56. 
275. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
276. See CARSTENS, supra note 254, at 18-22. 
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many towns, the guildhall served as, and ultimately became, the town 
hall.277 All told, given the connections between town councils and mer-
chant guilds, and between merchant guilds and early trading companies, 
it is difficult to believe that similarities between town councils and early 
corporate boards are coincidental. 
Additional evidence that early corporate boards were either imitat-
ing medieval town councils, or were based upon ideas held in common , 
comes from the comparing the composition of the two bodies. To begin 
with, one strikingly common feature of the medieval town councils, 
themselves , is the tendency of such councils to contain twelve, twenty-
four, or some other multiple or fraction of twelve, members. This is not a 
coincidence. Instead, it appears to derive from the twelve-person 
princely court of Charlemagne and his successors -with its six "scabini " 
or judgment-finders, four judges who read the law, and two advocates 
who protected the church.278 Significantly, twelve, twenty-four, or some 
multiple or fraction of twelve, also turns out to be a common number of 
board members in the earliest corporations. 279 The council of the Com-
pany of the Merchants of the Staple in Calais had twenty -four members, 
while the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers author-
ized the election of twenty-four assistants. 280 Twenty-four was also the 
number of assistants in the Russia Company, the number of assistants in 
the Eastla nd Company, the number of committees in the East India 
Company, and the number of directors of the Bank of England. 281 Be-
yond the similarities in numbers, there is also similarity in the descrip-
tions of the sort of persons who were to serve on these governing groups. 
The earlier discussion of the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant 
Adventurers pointed out how this charter called for the election of "the 
most sadd [sic] discreet and honest persons." 282 Similar language calling 
277. See H.W.C. DAVIS, MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 310-1 1 ( 1924). 
278 . See MUNDY & RIESENBERG, supra note 253, at 50. It would also not seem to be a coinci-
dence that there are twelve membe rs traditionally on a jury, and that these medieval town councils 
often had a judicial function. 
279. I SCOTT, supra note 97, at 151. 
280. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
281. See supra text accompanying notes 96, 121. The 1592 charter of the Levant Company 
called for twelve assistants, while both the 1605 charter of this company and the charter of the Mas-
sachusetts Bay Company called for eighteen (one and one-half times twe lve) ass istants. Even out-
liers, such as the seven board members of the Hudson 's Bay Company, or the thirteen members of 
the "Council of Virginia" originally governing the London Company, see supra text accompanying 
notes 105, 132, may simply have come from taking the traditional numbers of twe lve or six and 
adding one extra member to avoid tie votes. 
282. See supra text accompanying note 175. Similar language exists in the charter of the Rus-
sia Company. See supra text accompanying note 125. Interestingly, the charter of the Russia Com-
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for the more "discreet ," "honest" and "sad" persons was often found in 
descriptions of appropriate members for English town councils. 283 In ad-
dition , the chief executive of the Company of the Merchants of the Sta-
ple was called the mayor. 284 
3. The Motivations for Town Councils 
Given the strong evidence that early corporate boards were either 
an imitation of town councils, or at least must have stemmed from simi-
lar ideas about governance, examining the reasoning behind the use of 
town councils could provide an insight into the motivations for the early 
corporations selecting governance through boards. Unfortunately, it 
turns out that the motivations behind the use of town councils are them-
selves subject to considerable uncertainty. The problem is that town 
councils arose during a period for which records are scarce. 285 What is 
generally accepted is that early medieval towns typically were run under 
a representative of the king ,286 a local noble, 287 or the clergy. 288 We also 
know, as detailed above, that towns in the thirteenth and fourteenth cen-
turies increasingly had councils. Unfortunately, the evidence is limited 
as to exactly how and why municipal government traveled from this be-
ginning point to this end point. 
As discussed above , the creation of the Ipswich council gives us an 
example for which documentation is relatively complete as compared 
with other towns. The Ipswich chronicler mentions three organs of town 
government: the officers (the two bailiffs and four coroners); the council 
of twelve chief portmen; and the assembly of the town acting as a whole , 
which elected the officers and decided to have a council of chief port-
men. The existence of these three organs of town government suggests 
pany, in additio n to establishing a board of twenty-four assista nts, also ca lled for the elec tion of four 
"co nsuls." As discusse d earlier, the title "co nsul" comes from Italian mun icipal governments. See 
supra text acco mpany ing notes 253 , 258. 
283. PLAIT, supra note 245, at 119 (quo ting language which called for the "more honest and 
discree t," the "more discree t and fit," or the "wiser and sadder " to serve on town councils). 
284. See supra text accompanying note 166. 
285 . THOMPSON, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY, supra note 254, at 766. 
286. Engli sh town s, as mentioned above, commonly had an offic ial called a reeve, who was 
respon sible to the king for co llecting taxes and had the ch ief vo ice in the town. PLATT, supra note 
245 , at 132. Incidentally, when such an official was appoin ted for a shire , he was known as the shire 
reeve , or sheriff. 
287 . Medieval nobl es commonly exerc ised control over villages by having jurisdiction in the 
noble 's court to hear almost all crim inal and civ il cases invol ving the inhabitant s of villages within 
the noble ' s territory . See SWANSON, supra note 244 , at 74. 
288 . In Germany , bishops typicall y were the lord of the town. See Rorig, supra note 243, at 19, 
22. 
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that the burgesses of Ipswich had, generally speaking, three evident 
choices for municipal governance. They could simply have had the offi-
cers (which was all that the charter comrnanded).289 They could have had 
the officers coupled with assemblies of the whole town. Instead, they 
chose a third alternative--officers coupled with a town council. Using 
the language of corporate or business governance, the burgesses chose 
governance by a board, rather than governance solely by managing ex-
ecutives, or a partnership style scheme of all members of the community 
participating in management. The principal reason the Ipswich burgesses 
gave for making this choice is that other free boroughs had such coun-
cils; but this rationale simply forces us to ask why other towns had cre-
ated councils. As illustrated by the alternatives facing Ipswich, the broad 
question, in tum, breaks down into two subsidiary inquires: Why have a 
council rather than assemblies of the whole town? And, why have a 
council rather than having governance solely by executive officials? 
Historians have propounded a number of explanations for towns 
choosing a council over assemblies of all of the burgesses. One set of 
explanations consists of relatively benign practicality concerns. These 
include the Jack of interest by all of the burgesses in attending town as-
semblies,290 the notion (which is rather elitist) that many of the burgesses 
lacked the knowledge or judgment necessary to make quality deci-
sions,291 and the simple logistical problems entai led in holding meetings 
with increasing numbers of participants. 292 Needless to say, these con-
cerns remain the reasons often still expressed for centralized versus part-
289. At first glan ce, one might be tempted to equate the four coroners of Ipswich as being 
somet hing of a board. Later sources suggest, however , that the purpo se of having a number of per-
sons as coroners (or in sim ilar positions) was not to have group action, as in a board, but rather to 
allow bu sy burgesses (who might need to travel out of town on trade) to rotate who among the four 
would carry out the responsibilities of the offi ce. SWANSON, supra note 244, at 9 1. 
290. See LORRAINE ATTREED, THE KING'S TOWNS: IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL IN LATE 
MEDIEVAL ENGLISH BOROUGHS 18 (2001). Support for this rationalization comes from some of the 
medieval documents establishing town councils, which contain passages that explain suc h action 
was necessary because of poor attendance at assemblies, and that adopt requirements for co uncil 
members to take an oath that they will attend meetings. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 191-92. 
291. See CLARK & SLACK, supra note 251, at 128 (quoting complaint s by the magi st rates of 
Gloucester about the difficulties of dealing in any matter "w here the multitud e of burgesses have 
voice"); PLATT, supra note 245, at 120 (quo ting complaints directed at assemblies in Leicester and 
Northa mpton whe re "grea t trouble" ostensibly resulted "by reason of the multitude of the inhabi-
tants being of little substance and of no discr etion, who exceed in the assemblies the other approved, 
discreet , and well disposed per sons"). 
292. See I JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, 112 
(1905). The fact that sma ller towns retained open assemblies supports this as a factor. REYNOLDS, 
supra note 190, at 196. 
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nership style management in the modern business corporation with nu-
merous shareholders. 293 Other historians take a less benign view, finding 
the use of councils to be a mechanism for oligarchies of wealthier mer-
chants to freeze lower classes out of power. 294 
The other question is why the burgesses did not just leave the ex-
ecutive officials (the bailiffs and coroners) in charge of the town. After 
all, such an action both would have avoided the practicality problem s 
with assemblies, and would have allowed an oligarchy of wealthier bur-
gesses to cut others out of power . Perhaps the explanation is simply that 
all the wealthier burgesses , while desiring to cut the poorer townsfolk 
out of power , wished to preserve their own voice in municipal govern-
ance. If true, this would be consistent with the notion that boards (if they 
have the same motivation as town councils) exist so that larger share-
holders can elect themselves to a position in which they can protect their 
interests. 295 Yet, if the town councils existed solely to provide a direct 
voice for the powerful members of the community, then one might ex-
pect the number on the council to equal the number of person s with both 
influence and a desire to have such a voice. In this event, the size of the 
councils ought to be all sorts of numbers reflecting the random number 
of persons of influence in various communities . Instead, what one finds, 
293. See supra text accompanying notes 27-43. 
294. See PLATT, supra note 245 , at 119-24; see also REYNOLDS, sup ra note 190, at 191 (stat ing 
that until recently almost all historians had viewed the replacement of assemblies with town coun-
cils as a "ploy designed by the dominant patriciate to entrench its power." a thesis Professor Rey-
nolds rejects). While such debates over motivations are typical, and often irresolvable , grist for his-
torica l scholarship, an added complication with the establishment of town counci ls is that it is often 
unclear precisely what form of governance the medieva l town council replaced. A traditional. and 
perhaps romantic, narrative views counc ils as representin g a deviat ion from ear lier governance in 
which the towns opera ted through assemblies of the whole. Id. In a way, the Ipswich chronicle sup-
ports this story , as an assembly of the town crea ted the counci l, as well as took a variety of other 
steps to get the borough organized. Moreover , unless one assumes that the idea o f calling an assem-
bly of the town occurred to the Ipswich burgesses out of th in air, one might imagine that governance 
through such assemblies could have been occurring before the town received its charter (at least 
insofar as the matters addressed by the assem bly did not intmde into topics (taxes) of interest to the 
reeve or local noble). See REYNOLDS, IDEAS, supra note 265, at ch. VII, p. 6. If one accepts this 
narrative, then the choice by the burgesses of Ipswich (as well as other such towns) to shift from 
governa nce by officia ls and open assemblies, to governa nce by officials and town councils , pres-
aged the much later decisions by the Merchants of the Staple and the Merchant Adventurers simi-
larly to shift from having a mayor (for the Merchants of the Staple) or governor (for the Merchant 
Adventurers), plus assemb lies of the whole membership , to having a mayor or governor , plus a 
council or a board of assistants. An alternate narrative, however, views the counci l as having taken 
over directly from the previous contro l by noble, king or clergy. See STEPHENSON, supra note 245, 
at 40, 174. Under this view, the assembly of the town in Ipswich simply wou ld have been an 
convocatio n to provide formal accepta nce of a governing counc il whose existence may well have 
predated the charter. 
295. See supra text accompany ing notes 36-4 1. 
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as pointed out before , is that town councils commonly consisted of 
twelve, or some multiple or fraction of twelve , members. This use of 
symbolically significant numbers sugges ts that town counci ls, like me-
dieval parliaments , were a reflection of medieval European political 
ideas concerning the need for collective governance by representatives 
( even if the representatives are not from the entire town , but only from 
the wealthier inhabitants). 
One plausible explanation for having a town council, rather than 
just executi ve officials, comes from the tasks assigned to the council. In 
the middle of empowering the council to govern and maintain the bor-
ough and to do whatever shou ld be done for the well-being and honor of 
the town-all quite undefined - the one specific function assigned the 
Ipswich council , according to the chronicler , is to "render judgments" 
for the town. This parallel s the initial task of the echev ins of Saint-Omer, 
which was to judge cases involving the burgesses of the town. As re-
flected in these two examples, one of the primary roles of the early town 
councils was to adjudicate disputes (especially mercantile disputes) .296 
Accordingly, an underlying philosophy behind the establishment of town 
council s in lieu of governance solely by executive officials was a prefer-
ence for collecti ve determination s of contested matters in adjudi ca-
tion .297 This, of cour se, is still the preference reflected in the continuing 
right to trial by jury. To the extent that some of the function of the par-
liaments in medieval European kingdoms was adjudication of dis-
putes,298 this philosophy also partially explains the establishment of such 
parliament s. To what extent then does this function pertain to the corpo-
rate board of directors? The medieval preference for adjudicative deci-
sions by a group rather than an individual seems to support Professo r 
Bainbridge's ration alizat ion of corporate boards as ju stified by the supe-
riority of grou p decisions in matt ers of judgment 299 -eve n if mediev al 
European socie ties had not formally studied psycholo gy. On the other 
hand, the question of whether a group is better able to eva luate evidence 
presented in an adjudication (say to determine whether the evidence 
proves O.J. killed Nico le, just to give an example) may or may not be 
the same as whether a group is better able to evaluate a prospective 
296. See Rorig, supra note 243, at 16 1. 
297. See Reyno lds, supra note 190, at 23-34. The reintroduc tion of Roman law in the twelfth 
century led to the increasing use of single presiding judges in lieu of adjud icat ion by collective 
groups, as had been characteristic of earlier medieval Europe. Resistance to this trend occurred in 
the preserva tion of trial by jury in Eng land, and, significantly for purposes of this Article, in mer-
cantile matters, where asse mblies or groups of merchants contin ued to try disputes. Id. at 51-58. 
298. See supra text accompanying note 210. 
299. See supra text accompanying note s 30-3 l. 
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corporation. The earlier discussion of medieval European parliaments 
also noted that each member of the parliament represented and bound 
the particular corporate group (such as a town) that sent the representa-
tive .306 This is different from the concept of representation entailed in a 
corporate board elected at large by all the owners. Interestingly , the me-
dieval European town councils straddled both concepts of representa-
tion. Members in many medieval town councils were chosen by, and 
presumably represented, geographic divisions of the town (wards) or the 
particular corporate groups within the town (individual guilds).307 The 
Ipswich chronicle, however, describes the chief portmen , although se-
lected from different parishes, as having full power to represent the en-
tire town, rather than each representing his individual parish. Since there 
is no indication that the portmen (rather than the bailiffs and coroners) 
were the agents of the town in dealing with outsiders, the representation 
by the chief portmen of the entire town is the same concept as the repre-
sentation of the entire shareholders by a board elected at large . All told, 
whether democratically elected or not, whether representing different 
parts of the town or not, the town council was representative insofar as it 
existed to fulfill the function of providing consent on behalf of the whole 
town when assemblies became impractical. 
Significantly, the need for this concept of representation appears to 
flow in substantial measure from medieval ideas of collectives as corpo-
rations. As discussed earlier, medieval towns operated in such a fashion 
and assumed such an identity that they became a corporate entity (what 
medieval jurists referred to as a "universitates") , even before fifteenth 
century towns in England sought formal status as a "corporation ."308 
Both in popular conception, and in juristic theory, this existence as a 
306. See supra text accompanying note 223. 
307. See MUNDY & RIESENBERG, supra note 253, at 79-80. 
308. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 24, 49-53. Just as there are different conce pts of the corpo-
ration, as discussed earlier , there are also difference s in termin ology. The term "corpo ration " stems 
from a metaphor to a human body. See REYNOLDS, IDEAS, supra note 265, at ch. VI, p. 12. Indeed, 
the charter of the East India Compan y referred to the compan y as a "body corporate. " See supra text 
accompanying notes 137-39; CAWSTON & KEANE, supra note 116, at 87. This metaphor of a group 
as a body assumed greater significance as late- and post-medieval lawyers and j udges started view-
ing rights, such as holding property or appearing in court, as only being avai lable to persons (includ-
ing state -created corporate persons), and not simply to groups. See REYNOLDS, IDEAS, supra note 
190, at ch. VI, p.12. lt was this view that provo ked late medieval municipalities to seek charters 
making them corporatio ns in the sense of a fictitious person created by an act of the state. Universi-
tales comes from the Roman Law universilas, which encompa ssed a variety of associations known 
as collegia (co lleges), corpora (bodies) and sodalirares, and reflected the Roman Law and ear lier 
medieval European tradition that groups, and not just persons, could hold property and have lega l 
rights . ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE§ 65 (1976). 
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corporate entity carried within it certain nonns as to governance. One 
norm, which formed a basis for the towns' claims to self-government, 
was that the members of a corporative collective were entitled to make 
their own rules as to the internal affairs of the collective. 309 The other 
norm, which is central to the present discussion, is that such collectives 
made decisions by common consent, in other words, by the consent of 
all of the members of the collective. 310 Ideally , this meant unanimous 
consent of all of the members of the collective . 31 1 Practicality, however, 
dictated compromise with this ideal. Hence, there could be majority rule 
in case of irreconcilable disagreement, 312 and, critically here , there 
should be a council of representatives if open assemblies become im-
practical. 313 
This leads to the question of what was the origin of these corporate 
norms, particularly regarding consent through representation. The politi-
cal historian, Antony Black , traces the medieval European corporate 
norm of common consent through a council of representatives, to three 
sources.314 One source consists of Roman ideas of republican rule. Of 
course, a skeptic might wonder how much influence of Roman republi-
can writers, such as Cicero, could have had on medieval thinking , since 
Rome itself had not been a republic for five hundred years before its fall. 
Still, especially for Italian cities, Roman republican sources could have 
provided a handy reinforcement in support of those seeking governance 
through representative councils. Germanic traditions provide a second 
possible source. On the tribal level, early German tribes operated 
through popular assemblies in which all members had a duty to attend. 
As suggested earlier, 3 15 this tradition presumably also played a role in 
leading to the medieval parliaments . Another Germanic tradition in-
volved the guilds . Because the early guilds constituted entirely voluntary 
associations unable to coerce dissenting members , they were almost of 
necessity governed by common consent. Christian ideas of community , 
as practiced by Church organizations , provided a third source for the 
309. BLACK, supra note 254, at 25 (citing the medieval jurist, Bartolu s, for the propo sition that 
any univcrsita tes 'ca n make rules about its own affairs'); see id. at 52 (applying this proposition to 
the towns' claim s for self gove rnment) . Ironically, while towns might point to their corporate status 
as universitates in order to ju stify their claims to self-gove rnmen t, guild s also cou ld point to their 
status as universitates in order to claim a right to regulate their trade in contraven tion of city laws. 
fd. at 25 (citing the medieva l ju rist, Baldus). 
3 10. See id. at 53. 
31 1. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 190. 
312. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 61. 
313. See id. at 25. 
3 14. See id. at 53-65. 
315. See supra note 2 16. 
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norm of common consent. We shall look at the guilds and Church or-
ganizations in some detail below. 
If town councils incorporate notions of collective decision-making 
and representation, do they also embody the supremacy over executive 
officers called for under the current board-centered approach to corpo-
rate governance? Medieval European municipalities varied as far as 
whether the council appointed town officials , such as the mayor.316 In 
any event, municipal constitutions calling for the appointment of the 
mayor or other executive officials by town councils may have been more 
a means to cut broader assemblies out of the process than a means to en-
sure council control over executive officials. 317 Indeed, there seems to be 
little evidence that medieval Europeans viewed the role of the town 
council in a manner parallel to the current notion that corporate boards 
exist principally as a tool to monitor management. Interestingly , for ex-
ample, the Ipswich chronicle states that one of the tasks of the four coro-
ners (rather than the chief portmen) was to "superintend the acts of the 
bailiffs ."318 Finally , it is worth noting that if monitoring town officials 
against corruption was one of the purpose s of town council s, the evi-
dence suggests that town councils were not very successful in the under-
taking.319 In fact, perhaps the early failures of town councils to prevent 
corruption by municipal officials should have been seen as a harbinger 
of the perennial failure of corporate boards as a monitoring tool, all the 
way to Enron. 
C. Guilds 
Medieval Europe had numerous fraternal organizations referred to 
by a variety of labels, among the most common of which is "guild."320 
Many were simply social or religious fraternities organized for commu-
nal feasting and drinking and mutual defense and support .321 Of greater 
3 16. See R EYNOLDS, IDEAS, supra note 265, at ch. Xlll , p. 50; SWANSON, xupra note 244, al 
80. 
3 17. See PLAIT, .rnpra note 245, at 120. 
318. STEPHENSON, supra note 245, at 175. On the other hand, the notion that the coroners 
themselves were acting as some sort of monitoring board wou ld seem undermined by the fact that 
the two bailiffs were a lso two of the four coroners. 
3 19. See C LARK & SLACK, supra note 25 1, at 132-33. The complaint that management ofien 
controls current corporate boards by limiting the directors' access to infonn ation, see supra text 
accompanying note 54, finds its parallel in the observation that secrecy by the mayor and other civic 
offic ials kept the city councils of seventeenth century England in the dark. See id. at 13 1. 
320. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 72. The term "gu ild" (also spelled "gild") probably 
comes from the German "geld" as in money paid in for dues. BALDWIN, supra note 254, at 55. 
32 1. See H.W.C. DAV IS, supra note 277, at 300-0 1. 
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relevance here are guilds with more of an economic focus. Historians 
typically divide these economically oriented, or trade, guilds into two 
types: craft guilds and merchant guilds. 322 
There is a direct relationship between the governance of medieval 
European guilds and of the early trading companies. This is because the 
early trading companies, such as the Merchant Adventurers, were in 
large measure little more than merchant guilds themselves, which then 
evolved into the joint stock companies, all the while continuing the tradi-
tion of board governance. Moreover, working backwards even further, 
the precedent setting adoption of board governance by the Company of 
Merchant Adventurers in its 1505 charter seems to have been an out-
growth of the Merchant Adventurers' relationship with a merchant guild 
known as the Mercers Company. 
The Mercers Company was a guild of London merchants. 323 In the 
mid-fourteenth century, an assembly of London merchants adopted a 
code of rules for the Mercers Company, which, among other things, pro-
vided for the annual selection of four masters to govern the group. The 
Mercers received their first royal charter in 1393. The charter granted the 
Mercers the corporate attributes of perpetual existence and the right to 
hold property. 324 The 1393 charter also empowered the membership to 
elect annually four wardens to supervise the company. 325 It is unlikely, 
however, that either the four masters or the four wardens constituted a 
board as such. Instead, it is likely that these masters or wardens func-
tioned as executive officers, with the multiple number allowing a rota-
tion of responsibilities in order to avoid overburdening merchants busy 
with their own business, 326 and with significant decisions left for assem-
322. See id. Reality , however, often belied the notion of a neat divi sion between guilds of 
craftsmen or artisans, who made things, and guilds of merchant s, who bought and sold things. For 
example , the so-called guild merchant of the early English towns may have included butchers, bak-
ers, carpenters , masons, and all sorts of other craftsmen, who later fonned craft guilds. See 
SALZMAN, supra note 167, at 71. 
323. Indeed , the name "mercer," comes from the Latin, "me rcator ," meaning merchant. Evi-
dencing the close relationship between merchant guilds and medieval town government, the Mer-
cers boast that the first two mayors of London in the early thirt eenth century were Mercers. See P.H. 
DITCHFIELD, THE CITY COMPANIES OF LONDON AND THEIR GOOD WORKS: A RECORD OF THEIR 
HISTORY, CHARITY AND TREASURE 18 ( 1904). 
324 . As discussed earlier , see supra text accompanying note 264, the purpose of seeki ng this 
charter was probably to allow the company to hold property despite the prohibition on mortmain, 
which legislation, in 139 1, extended to reach towns and guilds that lacked charter s expressly em-
powering property ownership in perpetuity. 
325. See DITCHFIELD, supra note 323, at 19. 
326. See supra note 289 (discussing the practi ce of medieval towns electing four coroners in 
order to allow burgesses , who were busy with travel and business , to rotate who would carry out the 
duties of the office). 
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blies of the general membership whenever needed. One reason for reach-
ing this conclusion is because, in 1463, the Mercers changed their gov-
ernance structure to introduce what is clearly a board. Declaring that it 
was "odious and grievous " to hold many meetings of the membership, 
especially "for matters of no great effect," the membership of company 
passed a resolution that called for the election every year of twelve "sad 
and discreet" members to be assistants to the wardens. 327 The function of 
the assistants was to make decisions jointly with the wardens that all 
members of the guild would follow- in other words , to replace general 
assemblies with representative group decision-making. 
Two facts establish the connection between the Mercers' action in 
1463 and the board governance provision found four decades later in the 
charter of the Merchant Adventurers. 328 One is the obvious similarity in 
the two boards: Members of both boards had the title of assistants. While 
the Mercers board contained twelve members, and the Merchant Adven-
turers had twenty-four , twelve or twenty-four , as discussed earlier, 329 
were the traditional numbers of members on medieval town councils. 
Further , in both cases, we see the same sort of language about the nature 
of persons to serve ("sad and discreet") . The second fact is even more 
telling. As discussed earlier ,330 at the time of the 1463 Mercers' resolu-
tion, the London merchants engaged in export of manufactured goods 
(merchant adventurers) were a part of the Mercers Company, insofar as 
they formed any group at all.331 Hence, in establishing board govern-
ance, the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurer s was 
simply continuing to use a structure under which the London-based mer-
chant adventurers, as part of the Mercers , already operated. 332 
327. See DITCHFIELD, supra note 323, at 20; O' Donnell , supra note 96, at 63 . 
328. For a discussion o f the 1505 charter of the Merchant Adventurers, see supra text accom-
panying notes 179, 241 , 280. 
329. See supra text accompan ying note s 251 . 
330. See supra text accompa nying note 174. 
33 1. In fact, des;, ite the 1505 charter, the Merchant Adventurers kept their minutes in the same 
book with the Mercers' until 1526 . See CHEYNEY, sup ra note 172, at 166. 
332. A somew hat similar conn ection may exis t between the London-based Grocer s Company, 
the Levant Company, and, in tum , the East India Compan y. The Grocers-w hich probably began as 
a guild of merchants that dealt at whol esale (en gros), see Ditchfield, supra note 323, at 34, elec ted 
a board of six ass istant s as earl y as 1397. See LUJO BRENTANO, ON THE HISTORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS AND THE ORIGIN OF TRADE-UNIONS 62 ( 1870). The Leva nt Compa ny ap-
pears to have been related to the G rocers, as evidenced by the Levant Company's use of the Gro-
cers' hall for the Levant Company 's meeting s until 1666. I DAVIS, supra note 292, at 224 . The East 
India Co mpan y, in tum , used the books of the Levant Company for the East India Company 's initial 
organizati onal meetings. Id. Indeed, the origins of the East India Co mpany in earlier guilds reve r-
berat ed for many years in the continuati on by the East India Co mpany of various guild tradit ions, 
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Given that the guilds are the most direct source for the use of 
boards in the early trading companies, the question becomes why did the 
guilds themselves adopt the use of boards. As suggested by the earlier 
discussion of medieval town councils, 333 municipal government proba-
bly influenced guild government. 334 Nevertheless, it would oversimplify 
the origins of corporate boards to view the guilds simply as a conduit 
that imitated town councils, and then, by turning into the early trading 
companies, established the pattern for later corporate boards. This is be-
cause, as also mentioned earlier, 335 it is possible as well to view the 
guilds as one of the sources leading to the medieval European towns' use 
of councils. In other words, guilds and towns were inexorably linked in a 
relationship in which ideas and practices traveled both ways, and that, in 
tum, reflected a broader set of political ideas and practices also spurring 
the use of parliaments in medieval Europe. 
To understand the development of boards in the medieval guilds, it 
helps to start by asking what sort of decisions and tasks were involved in 
the governance of the guilds. Probably the most important decisions 
were the admission of new members 336 and the adoption of ordinances 
governing the members' conduct. 337 Collection and appropriate use of 
funds from the members meant that there was a need for financial ad-
ministration. 338 Significantly, guilds also commonly sought to resolve 
disputes involving their members, which, in turn, led the merchant 
guilds often into performing the role of a sort of mercantile court. 339 
In their early years, the guilds made these decisions and carried out 
these tasks through a governance structure consisting of a combination 
of executive officers and general meetings of all the membership .340 Sig-
nificant decisions, including admission of new members and the adop-
includ ing calling shareholders "b rothers " and requiring they take oath s of memb ership . I SCOTI, 
supra note 97, at 152. 
333 . See supra text accompanying notes 271-77, 303-07. 
334. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 58 ("craft gui lds not infrequently used the pattern of city 
gove rnment as a model"). 
335. See supra text acco mpanying notes 266, 307. 
336. See I DAVIS,suprano te292 , at 152-53. 
33 7. Such ordinances often addresse d personal behavior so as to promote the members' living 
a virtuous life. See BALDWIN, supra note 254, at 56-57. In the craft and merchant guilds, the ordi-
nances typically regulated the quality of goods and honesty in dealin gs. I DA VIS, supra note 292, at 
310. 
338. See I DAVIS, supra note 292 , at 304. 
339. See SWANSON, supra note 244 , at 77. 
340. A long similar lines, medieval European univer sities, such as at Bologna , Pari s and Ox-
ford, followed a governance model based upon general assemblie s of students (the Bologna model) 
or masters (the Paris model) , who elected officers (rec tors and the like). See LOWRIE J. DALY, THE 
MEDIEVAL UNIVERSITY 1200- 1400, at 30-75 (196 1). 
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tion of ordinances to regulate the guild, occurred at meetings of all the 
membership. These meetings, often called a "morgensprache" (morning 
speech), occurred at least annually and often were accompanied by 
ceremonies and festivities. 341 Commonly , the guild members at the an-
nual morgensprache elected officers for the guild. 342 Among the tasks of 
the chief officer(s) of the guild would be presiding over the morgen-
sprache, caring for the guild's property, collecting fees due the guild, en-
forcement of the guild's ordinances, and attempting to settle disputes be-
tween members of the guild.343 On the other hand, if the enforcement of 
an ordinance, or the resolution of a dispute , required adjudication, then 
the matter commonly went before the whole membership at the morgen-
sprache. 344 
While, at the early stage, the guild governance structure contained 
nothing like a board of directors, this early governance structure is nev-
ertheless significant to the history of the corporate board. To begin with, 
the early guild governance structure, consisting of general membership 
meetings and elected executive officials, appears to parallel the govern-
ance structure of both the Company of the Merchants of the Staple and 
the Company of Merchant Adventurers before these two early trading 
companies adopted board governance. 345 In other words, these two early 
trading companies evolved in their governance in same manner as many 
guilds evolved in the guilds' governance. This further evidences the link 
between the development of board governance in guilds and its devel-
opment in the early trading companies. 
In addition, the early guild tradition of decisions by general assem-
blies made an important contribution to the ultimate development of 
boards. This is because, as mentioned earlier when discussing the moti-
vations for the development of town councils, 346 guild practices were 
one of the sources for the idea that decisions impacting an entire collec-
tive group required the consent of all in the group. At the earliest time, 
when guilds were probably more fraternal organizations for drinking and 
34 1. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 24. 
342. See I DAVIS, supra note 292 , at 152. Guilds varied in the titles and roles of such officers. 
The Ipswich chronicle describes the election of an aldem1an to head the guild merchant for the 
town, with four others to assist. See supra text accompanying notes 273-77. As discussed above, the 
Mercers elected four individuals, at first called masters, and later called wardens, to be the executive 
officers for the guild. The Calimala Guild (the guild of the cloth merchants) in Florence had four 
consu ls and a treasurer as its senior executive officers. See EDGCUMBE STALEY, THE GUILDS OF 
FLORENCE 117 ( 1906). 
343. See I DA VIS, supra note 292 , at 152. 
344. See id. at 153. 
345. See supra text accompanying note 163. 
346. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3. 
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mutual aid and defense, than for coordinated economic activity, the prin-
ciple of unanimous consent may have been the result of simple practi-
calities-if someone did not like the decision, they could leave.347 
Moreover, the basic notion of a brotherhood, whose members shared fes-
tivities and looked out for each other, seems intuitively more conducive 
to collective and consensus-based decision-making, than it is to a com-
mand-oriented hierarchical govemance. 348 Over time, however, what 
started as simple practicality, or intuitive notions of brotherhood , be-
came embedded in custom and norm- and even could influence Canon 
Law jurists to tum a Roman Law doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab om-
nibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be approved by all") from a 
technical rule into a broad principle of governance. This, in tum, meant 
that when general assemblies became impractical in guilds or towns, 
some institution was needed to step in and give consent on behalf of the 
overall community. In the case of towns, this institution was the town 
council. As suggested by the discussion of the Mercers Company, in the 
case of the guilds, this institution was also a council or a board of assis-
tants. 
The switch by guilds to using boards occurred gradually across 
Europe. In Italy, fourteenth century Florentine guilds provide examples 
of the use of complex systems of councils that mirrored the complexity 
of Florentine city govemment. 349 Guilds in some German cities had six 
or eight person councils by the fourteenth century.350 In England, a mer-
chant guild council of twenty-four members (who were virtually the 
same persons who served on the twenty-four member town council) ex-
isted at Leicester in the mid thirteenth century.351 Documents of Lon-
don's Grocers Company record the selection in 1397 of six persons to 
aid the wardens in the discharge of their duties.352 By and large, how-
ever, the move by the guilds toward the use of boards of assistants oc-
curred in the fifteenth (as illustrated by the Mercers Company) and six-
teenth centuries. 353 
347. In a rough way, this is John Locke's social contract theory writ small and in a real world 
context. 
348. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 57. 
349. See STALEY, supra note 342, at 119 (discussing the two councils in the Calima la gu ild). 
350. See BRENTANO, supra note 332, at 62 (giving the examples of the Spinwetter guild at 
Bale and the Tailors guild of Vienna). 
351. See PLATT, supra note 245, at 133. 
352. See supra note 332. 
353. See BRENTANO, supra note 332, at 62. Indeed , the guild merchant at Ipsw ich appears to 
have had a familiar looking board of twenty-four by the t ime of James I. See l SCOTT, supra note 
97, at 7. 
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As with the development of town councils, there are different theo-
ries as to what prompted the guilds to switch to the use of boards. The 
Mercers' resolution suggests that the motive lay in the burden on the 
members entailed by holding assemblies for less important matter s.354 
Yet, this raises the question of what were these less important matters 
that produced burdensome meetings. Since the matter s that went before 
the morgensprache were admission of new members, adoption of ordi-
nances, election of officers, and adjudication of dispute s, and since ad-
mission of new members, adoption of ordinances, and election of offi-
cers genera lly occurred at the annual morgensprache -which, as an 
occasion of festival and ceremony, would take place anyway and pre-
sumably would be well attended-it seems that the principal matters that 
called for overly frequent meetings would have been the adjudication of 
disputes. Hence, it appears that a primary reason for the board of assis-
tants would have been to hear disputes . The parallel with the early town 
councils, such as the Ipswich chief portmen or the echevins of Saint-
Omer, for whom adjudication was a primary task,355 is obvious. Simi-
larly, adjudication of disputes was a function of the board of assistants of 
the Merchant Adventurers. 356 In all of these cases, the common ideology 
producing boards, which remains reflected in the jury system , is the de-
sire for collective judgment in adjudications. 
The a lternate exp lanation for the development of boards of assis-
tants in the guilds also finds a parallel in town councils. Many historians 
contend that the boards in the guilds, like the town councils, represented 
an attempt by the wealthier members to cut other members out of gov-
emance.357 However, given the custom and norm of collective consent, it 
presumably would not have been accepta ble to place entire control in the 
guild officers. The solution is the creation of board s of assistants with , as 
illustrated by the Mercers' resolution , a symbolically significant number 
of twelve ( or a multiple or fraction of twelve) members, and with 
agreement by the membership to accept the decisions of the board. 
354. One can find a reflection of such a burden in the apparent difficulty the guilds had in ob-
taining attendance at general meeting s. as evidenced by the adoption of quorum requirements, see 
BRENTANO, supra note 332, at 61-62, and penalties for non-attendance , see O'Donnell, supra note 
96, at 63. 
355. See supra text accom panying notes 296-97. 
356. See supra text accompanying note 300. 
357. See Brentano, supra note 332, at 87-88. Evidence that an oligarchic power grab, rather 
than genera l membership complaints about burdensome meetings, may have been beh ind the estab-
lishment of boards of assistants includes the eventual replacement of elected boards by self-
perpetua ting boards (in which existing board members selec ted new board members), and protests 
by members in some of the guilds, such as London's Weavers, about the changes. See id. 
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This just leaves the question of the extent to which the boards in the 
guilds served to monitor and control the guild's officers. Particularly in 
the sixteenth century, the boards of assistants of many of the London 
guilds acquired the power to appoint officer s in lieu of appointment by 
the membership at the annual meeting. 358 Yet , as suggested by the 
roughly parallel developments involving English town councils, 359 trans-
fer of the power to elect the guild's officers from general assemblies to 
boards of assistants may have been more an effort to shut out the general 
membership, than it was an effort to establi sh monitoring by the boards. 
Also, as with town councils , when the guilds wanted to delegate moni-
toring of their officers , they often did this by assigning the task to a 
smaller group , rather than to the board of assistants. For example, re-
cords of the London -based Grocers guild show the selection of four 
auditors "to superintend the accounts and delivery of the wardens." 360 
Similarly, monitoring of the consuls and treasurer (the senior executive 
officers) of Florence's Calimala guild was the funct ion of three "Sin -
dacatori" (general inspectors) , rather than the responsibility of either the 
twelve person general council or the eighteen person special council of 
the guild. 361 
D. Church Councils 
No discussion of representative bodies in Europe of the Middle 
Ages would be complete without reference to the councils in var ious in-
stitutions of the Church. Admittedly, there is not the extensive evidence 
of linkage between the Church councils and the boards of the early trad-
ing companies that one discovers when dealing with the councils of 
towns and guilds. Still, given the central role of the Church in medieval 
European life and thought , it would be surpri sing if no intellectual com-
monality existed between Church councils and trading company boards. 
Councils existed on a variety of levels in the western European 
Church during the Middle Ages. Provincial synods and local church 
councils met fairly frequently in some parts of medieval Europe. 362 Of 
358. See I DAVIS, supra note 292, at 2 13. 
359. See supra text accompanying note 294 . 
360. BRENTANO, supra note 332, at 62. 
36 1. See STALEY, supra note 342, at 121. 
362. See ANTONY BLACK, COUNCIL AND COMMUNE: THE CONCILIAR MOVEMENT AND THE 
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY HERITAGE 9 (1979). The degree to which institutions affi liated with the 
Church of medieval Western Europe followed a representative governance structure varied. The 
Dominican Order, which received papal approbation in 12 16, provides an example of representative 
governance by an organization within the medieval Churc h. The constitutions of the Dominican 
Order contained regulations for daily life and for the government of the Order. There were three 
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more far reaching influence were the general councils of the Church. 
From the first ecumenica l council convened at Nicaea in 325, councils 
occurred among representatives of some or all of the five patriarchal 
sees (Constantinople, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem) . These 
councils were chiefly concerned with religious doctrine, and recognition 
of their pronouncements as authoritative established councils as the 
highest authority within the Church on questions of doctrine. 363 An im-
portant development in using councils as a tool of governance occurred 
in the middle of the eleventh century, when the College of Cardinals ob-
tained the power to elect the Pope. Originally, cardinals were simply cer-
tain Roman clergy who performed liturgical functions in the great basili-
cas, but, in the eleventh century, the College of Cardinals became the 
Pope 's close counselors, and, in 1059, Nicholas II issued a decree grant -
ing the College the power to elect the Pope .364 The immediate motiva-
tion for this development was to remove the intervention of lay officials 
(such as the Holy Roman Emperor) in the selection of Popes. 365 The 
long-range impact, however, was to advance a model of group selection 
of a chief official (as in boards and CEOs). It also inevitably raised the 
question of whether the power to elect gave the power to remove. 
The implications of the power of the College of Cardinals to elect 
the Pope came to roost in the so-called Great Schism. A decision of the 
College of Cardinals in 1378 to recant their election of Urban VI, and to 
elect Clementine VI instead, led to the embarrassing spectacle of two 
levels of government - the local convent, the provincial chapter, and the general chapter. The mem-
bers of each convent elected a prior , who governed along with the friars (members) in accordance 
with the constitution and the rules of the Order. The prior and two delegates from each convent in 
the province elected the provincial prior and provincial chapter (a governing council). The provin-
cial chapter s, in tum, elected the members of the general chapter (the governing council for the 
overall Order). The general chapter had the power to enact legislation changing the regulations gov-
erning the Order . The general chapter met annually until 1370, and continued to meet every two or 
three yea rs thereafter . Interestingly , in light of later disputes over supre macy of councils versus 
Popes, eac h chapter had the power to remove officials at its level. See CARSTENS, s upra note 254, at 
25-28 . By contrast, the Benedictine monasteries elected an abbot for life , who was supposed to con-
sult with the monks , but who had the final say in all decisions . See I DA VIS, supra note 292, at 51 ; 
BISSO\J, supra note 188, at 141-42. The Franc iscan s also placed greater authority in their executive 
officials (particularly the general minister at the head of the order) than the Dominican s, but sub-
jected the officials to reelection at a set term and to removal for cause. See I DAVIS, supra note 292, 
at 64. 
363. See COL!SH, supra note 234, at 340-41. Following the schism between the Roman and 
Greek Churches , councils of the Roman Church, starting with the First Lateran council of 1123, 
typically occurred without repre sentatives of the Greek Church. 
364. See BRIAN TIERNEY, FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCILIAR THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
THE MEDIEVAL CANONISTS FROM GRATIAN TO THE GREAT SCHISM 69-70 (reprint 1968) ( 1955). 
365 . See COLISH, supra note 234 , at 341. 
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competing lines of Popes (one in Avignon and the other in Rome).366 Af-
ter several earlier efforts failed, the Council of Constance in 1414 
through 1418 resolved the schism with decrees that appeared to establish 
the supremacy of councils within the Roman Church. Not only did the 
Council of Constance depose the contenders and arrange for the election 
of a new Pope under a procedure designed by the council, it set forth a 
decree announcing that, as a legitimately assembled general council , 
everyone of whatever standing or office within the Church, including the 
Pope, was bound to obey its order eradicating the schism. Moreover, the 
Council of Constance promulgated a second decree calling for regular 
councils.367 Constance turned out, however, to be the high point for the 
supremacy of councils within the Roman Church. After a later council at 
Basel came to naught, Popes failed to call regular councils and effec-
tively reduced the decree from Constance claiming supremacy for coun-
cils to cover only the special circumstance of resolving the Great 
Schism.368 
Despite its ultimately limited impact on the governance of the 
Church itself, the Council of Constance remains important because it 
represented a culmination of thought and writings concerning the power 
of councils versus Popes (and, inferentially, other governing officials). 
Some of this writing and thought deals with issues unique to Christianity 
and the constitution of the Church. 369 Other writing and thought raises 
issues whose political importance could transcend Church governance. 
One example is whether election of a governing official by a group 
meant that the group also had the power of removal, which, in tum, 
raises the question of what is the source of a governing official's author-
ity.370 More narrowly , recognizing that human fallibility could afflict 
even the highest governing officials, medieval scholars explored the 
grounds and procedure for removing an errant Pope. 371 Given that these 
considerations of Church governance occurred as medieval European 
366. See TIERNEY, supra note 364, at 1-2. 
367. See BLACK, supra note 362, at 17-18. 
368. See JOHN N. FIGGIS, STUDIES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON TO GROTIUS: l 414-
1625, at 40-42 (2d ed. reprint 1956) (1907). 
369. Such as whether statements attributed to Christ delegated authority to the heirs of Saint 
Peter (the Popes) or to the whole Church , and the relationship of the Roman See to the whole 
Church. See TIERNEY, supra note 364, at 25-36 . 
3 70. See id. at 56 ( citing the writing of the medieval scholar of Canon Law, Laurenti us, who 
drew a distinction between the divine origin of the powers of the offices of Pope or Emperor , and 
the selection by human electors of which individuals occupied the offices). 
371. This meant laboring to reconcile the doctrine that a heretic could not be Pope , with the 
doctrine that only the Pope could judge what was heresy. See id. at 57-64 (discussing the effort of 
the medieval scholar of Canon Law, Huguccio, to reconcile the conflict). 
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kingdoms had been experimenting with the power of parliamentary as-
semblies versus kings, historians have debated whether the medieval 
scholars of Church governance were drawing upon the political events 
occurring around them, or whether the political events were emanating 
from ideas developed as part of Church governance under Canon Law. 372 
For purposes of this Article, what is most important about the ru-
minations of scholars in medieval Europe on the powers of Church 
councils versus Popes lies in the efforts of these scholars to draw upon 
medieval ideas of corporation law-not in the sense of a business corpo-
ration, but, as discussed before, in the sense of a collective society, 
including towns, guilds, and the Church. Here, we encounter the conflict 
between the authoritarian views of Pope Innocent IV-who drew upon 
the concept of the Church as a corporation to argue that the power of 
decision rested in the head (i.e. the bishop for the local church, or the 
Pope for the overall Church)-and the views of the noted thirteenth-
century scholar of Canon Law, Cardinal-bishop Henricus de Segusio 
(Hostiensis), who argued that power over a corporation resided both in 
the head and in the membership. 373 Amusingly, some of the debate 
between proponents of the two schools of thought wanders off into the 
metaphor of the corporation as a body. (Indeed, the word "corporation" 
derives from the Roman "corpus" as in "body." 374) So, those supporting 
Innocent IV's position sometimes talk of the power of the head to rule 
the body.375 The arguments of Hostiensis, however, were not meta-
phorical. Speaking , for example, of the power of a local bishop to 
alienate property , Hostiensis noted that this decision could produce a 
loss from which the whole of the corporation (the local church) would 
suffer. Since this action, therefore, impacted the common welfare, it re-
quired the consent of the entire corporation, not just its head. 376 In other 
words, we are back to the Roman and Canon Law doctrine of quod 
omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be 
approved by all"). 
372. Compare id. at 18-20 (Canon Law provided the source for conciliar ideas in the Church); 
Tierney, supra note 212, at 8-13, 15 (showing that Canon Law principles influenced development of 
medieval European parliaments), with FIGGIS, supra note 368, at 33-36 (medieval European parlia-
ments influenced conciliar ideas in the Church). 
373. See TIER.NEY, supra note 364, at 106- 108. 
374. See supra note 308. 
375. See GIERKE, supra note 232, at 28-29. 
376. See TIER.NEY, supra note 364, at 49, 122-24. The concern that bishops, if not required to 
gain conse nt, might aliena te local church propeny to the prejudice of the local church suggests a 
monitoring function behind the idea of consent. Indeed, the notion that the corpora te group, or its 
representatives, needed to keep an eye on potentially misbehaving officials seems to have received a 
stronger expression in the Church than with parliaments , town councils, guild councils or trading 
company boards. See id. at 123-24. 
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The crisis of the Great Schism brought to the fore the role of a rep-
resentative group, in other words a council, as the means by which the 
entire corporate body could act upon a matter that concerned all. As 
stated above, long practice had recognized the authoritative nature of the 
pronouncements of general councils of the Church on matters of doc-
trine. Medieval scholars of Canon Law provided a doctrinal explanation 
for this recognition by stating that action of general councils provided 
the "universal consent" necessary to make decisions on matters touching 
"the general state of the Church." 377 This is reminiscent of the sum-
monses, discussed earlier, 378 which called upon English towns and shires 
to send representatives to parliaments with plena potestas ("full power") 
to consent to actions of the parliaments, so as to meet the requirement of 
quad omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be 
approved by all").379 Also, as seen before when dealing with medieval 
parliaments and town councils, the concept of representation employed 
by the proponents of Church councils did not necessarily entail democ-
ratic election. For example, the principal proponents of conciliar power 
at Constance-Z abarella, d'Ailly and Gerson-asserted that the power 
of acting as a council for the whole Church rested upon those with indi-
'd 1 h . . h b. h 380 v1 ua aut onty, 1.e., t e 1s ops. 
Overall, what emerges from Church councils is additional evidence 
for an overarching medieval theory of corporate governance applicable 
to kingdoms, the Church, towns and guilds. Under this theory, decisions 
impacting the entire corporate collective require consent of the collec-
tive. In circumstances in which an assembly of the entire corporate body 
is impractical, consent from a group, who are representative in a sym-
bolic, even if not a democratically elected, sense, becomes necessary. 
The early trading companies applied this overarching ideology in adopt-
ing governing boards. 
377. See id at 47-53. 
378. See supra text accompany ing note 193. 
379 . The full power en tailed in the conce pt of p/ena potestas should be distinguished from the 
concep t of plenitudo potestatis ("fullness of power ") acco rded to the Pope. At leas t as the later term 
grew to be understood , plenitudo po testatis went beyond the notion that an individual had authority 
to represe nt a broader group , and entail ed being both the source of all authority and eve n above the 
law. See TIERNEY, supra note 364, at 146-48. 
380. See BLACK, supra note 362, at 19-22. 
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V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE PURPOSE OF CORPORA TE 
BOARDS 
167 
Having traced the historical and political origins of the corporate 
board of directors, the question becomes what can this tell us about the 
purpose of corporate boards today . In fact, the history of corporate 
boards provide s conflicting evidence with respect to the purposes 
claimed by modem scholars for the board-centered model of corporate 
governance. 
The development of corporate boards , as well as the development 
of other representative institutions in the Europe of the Middle Ages, is 
consistent with the notion that the use of boards (like other representa-
tive institutions in medieval Europe), in part, arose out of problems with 
direct governance by groups that have large numbers of members (in 
other words , the central management rationale). This is nicely illustrated 
by the example of the Levant Company , which had no board when the 
company started with four members , but received a new charter provid-
ing for a board of twelve assistants when the membership increased. 381 
Along the same lines , the apparent evolution in some medieval munici-
palities from governance involving assemblies of all townsfolk, to gov-
ernance by town councils , occurred as medieval towns grew in popula-
tion. 382 Yet, if practicalities ruled out governance by the general 
membership once the organization reached a certain size, this does not 
explain why either trading companies , or towns , guilds, kingdom s or 
institutions of the Church , would employ a board , council or parliament , 
rather than an autocratic governance structure under just executive offi-
cials . Indeed , representative institutions declined, and autocratic rule in-
creased , in kingdoms , towns and the Church in much of Europe follow-
ing the Middle Ages. 383 
The origins of the corporate board also provid e some support for 
Professor Bainbridge 's argument that the reason for boards lies in the 
superiority of groups in making decisions involving judgment. As dis-
cussed earlier , a common task for town council s, guild council s, parlia-
ments, and early trading company boards was the adjudication of dis-
putes. 384 This seems to reflect the notion that groups are more likely to 
get the correct result in ferreting out truth than would an individu al 
38 1. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31. 
382. See supra note 292 and text accompanying notes 289-92. 
383. See supra text accompa nying notes 259. 
384. See supra text acco mpanying notes 185, 242, 296, 300, 339. 
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judge. 385 Also, the tradition of consultation and consensus that formed 
part of the basis for the development of medieval parliaments 386 seems to 
have arisen not just out of ideas of consent, but also out of the feudal ob-
ligation of nobles to provide advice to the king. 387 Underlying the obli-
gation to provide advice must be some notion of the superiority of 
groups over individuals in making decisions. Nor was the idea that 
groups might reach superior decisions over individuals merely implicit 
in medieval political thinking. Rather, this concept was a central tenet in 
the writings of the noted medieval political philosopher, Marsiglio of 
Padua. For example, in his work, Defender of the Peace, Marsiglio ar-
gued that the best laws came from the entire collective (universitas 
civium) because '"when the whole corporation of citizens is directed to-
wards something with its intellect and sympathy , the truth of that object 
is judged more certainly and its common utility weighed more care-
fully. "' 388 Still, despite all this being said, it is critical to keep in mind 
that the proposition that groups, such as boards, make decision s superior 
to those made by an individual leader (with, of course, advice) was a 
highly contested claim in medieval Europe, as it remains to the pre-
sent. 389 Indeed, Marsiglio of Padua was condemned as a heretic, and was 
not that influential at the time he wrote. 390 
It is clear that some representative institutions in medieval Europe 
had the purpose, at least in part, of mediating between various constitu-
encies, thus supporting the notion that corporate boards exist in order to 
mediate between various corporate claimants. 391 Yet, the medieval rep-
resentative institutions that had a mediating role, such as the parliaments 
and some town councils , contained representatives from various con-
stituencies. 392 So, for example, the French Estates General and provin-
cial Estates take their name from the presence of representatives of three 
classes-nobility, clergy, and burghers- that made up medieval society 
( at least in the view of the time). 393 By contrast, solely the members of 
385. See supra text accompanying notes 297, 299. 
386 . See supra text accompanying note 211. 
387. See COLTSH, supra note 234 , at 345. 
388 . See BLACK, supra note 254, at 93 (quoting MARSIGLTO, THE DEFENDER OF THE PEACE, 
DICTIO I). 
389. See generally MACHIA YELL!, THE PRINCE, chs. 5, 6, I 0, 12 (Quent in Skinner & Russell 
Price eds., 1988); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, chs. 19-20 (1976 ed.) ( 165 1). 
390. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 86, 95. 
391. Albeit, these politica l institutions would have been more focused on mediating over who 
would pay how much taxes or the like, than over who would receive how much distributions from a 
venture. 
392. See supra text accompanying note s 187, 216, 223. 
393. See supra text accompanying note 203. 
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the company typically elected trading company boards, 394 and there is no 
suggestion that such boards represented anyone else. Moreover, the ac-
tive role often taken by the general membership in the early corpora-
tions-as seen in the examples of the Russia Company, 395 and the Vir-
gmia Company (with its quarterly meetings of the general 
membership) 396-is inconsistent with the notion that early boards had 
any power to act as neutral arbiters in order to protect various stake-
holders in the corporate enterprise from the shareholders. Finally, while 
shareholders with a larger stake in the venture may well have ended up 
on the early boards, the fact that voting in proportion to ownership arose 
only later397 suggests that early boards were not primarily vehicles to en-
sure that large, albeit non-controlling, shareholders could elect them-
selves or their nominees to protect their interests. 
Significantly, the rationale for corporate boards most favored by 
modern scholars-that boards exist to monitor management on behalf of 
passive investors-is the rationale that finds the least support in the his-
torical origins of the corporate board. This is because the board-centered 
model of corporate governance did not originate in the joint stock com-
pany with its passive investors. Instead, it was a form of governance that 
the joint stock company inherited when it evolved out of the regulated 
companies, like the Merchant Adventurers or Merchants of the Staple. In 
such regulated companies, the members each conducted their own busi-
nesses, and, hence, hardly needed the protection of a board to monitor 
the managers running the company. Instead of having an oversight func-
tion, the role of the board in these earliest trading companies was legisla-
tive (passing ordinances to regulate the membership) and adjudicative 
(hearing disputes involving the members). 398 
Of course, the fact that the original boards did not have a monitor-
ing function on behalf of passive investors does not mean that the board 
did not evolve into this primary responsibility as the regulated compa-
nies evolved into the joint stock companies. History and biology are re-
plete with institutions and organisms that originated with one purpose 
and then successfully migrated into a different function. Yet, as dis-
cussed at the beginning of this Article, the record of the board as an in-
394. See supra text accompanying note I 07. 
395. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27. 
396 . See supra text accompanying notes I 05-11. 
397. For example , in the case of the East India Company, voting in proportion to ownership 
arose a half century , or perhaps even a century , after the company began. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 155-62. 
398. See supra text accompanyin g note 179. 
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stitution to monitor management on behalf of passive shareholders has 
not been one of unmitigated success . 399 Perhaps the historical origin of 
the corporate board helps explain why. Specifically , since the board was 
not designed originally as a monitoring tool, one should not be totally 
surprised if boards tum out not to be all that effective as a means to 
monitor management. Moreover, the political origins of the corporate 
board suggest a further problem boards faced when they evolved into a 
tool to monitor management. Medieval political thinking contained an 
unresolved tension between preferences for hierarchical versus collec-
tive decision-making.400 Most especially, as witnessed in the events be-
fore and after the Council of Constance, the issue of whether a represen-
tative body could call the Pope, king or other chief official to account, 
was highly contested.401 Of course, the legal issue of the corporate 
board's power over the CEO is now resolved beyond all doubt in the 
board's favor.402 Nevertheless, the norm of deference to the CEO that 
pervades corporate board culture renders boards reluctant to assert their 
supremacy. 403 Might it be fair to speculate that at least some of this hesi-
tancy reflects the awkward melding of hierarchical and representative 
ideas lingering still from the medieval political heritage of the corporate 
board? 
While the historical and political origins of the corporate board of 
directors provide conflicting evidence regarding the various purposes 
modem commentators claim for the board, these origins suggest a criti-
cal function which modem commentators seem to have overlooked. This 
function is providing political legitimacy. The unifying theme behind 
medieval parliaments, town councils, guild councils, councils of the 
Church, and the boards of the trading companies, is that they provided 
the means to comply with the "corporate law" rule that "what touches all 
shall be consented to by all," in circumstances when consent by assem-
bly of the entire group was impractical.404 While the rationale for this 
rule of consent may have included the notion that wiser decisions result 
from consent of the entire group ( or at least from a group of representa-
tives), or that the requirement of consent by all ( or the representatives of 
all) allowed various constituents to protect their interests, or that the re-
quirement of consent served as a check on possible misdeeds of the 
399. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58. 
400. See supra text accompanying note 233. 
40 I. See supra text accompanying notes 366- 72. 
402. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
403. See supra text accompanying notes 68-80. 
404. See supra text accompanying notes 238-41. 
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ruler, there also seems to be the notion that legitimate authority require s 
consent, regardless of the impact of consent on the quality of decisions 
and governance. 
Indeed, once we start looking at the role of the board in terms of 
political legitimacy, it is possible to identify the achievements of the in-
stitution, and the reasons for its continued existence , despite a rather 
modest record in terms of achieving goals of wealth maximization and 
business efficiency. An irony of the development of the trading company 
boards is that this occurred as representative political institutions were 
waning in Europe. At the end of the Middle Ages, parliamentary assem-
blies receded in the face of the growing power of monarchs in Spain and 
France , and princes in Italy and Germany. 405 After Constance, Papal au-
thority grew triumphant over councils in the Church.406 Town council s 
fell in favor of princes in Italian cities , and royal bureaucrats in 
France. 407 Hence, an unheralded achievement of corporate boards may 
have been to help preserve medieval traditions of representative institu-
tions at a time when those institutions were under siege elsewhere. 
Moreover, not only did the trading company boards help preserve me-
dieval political ideas of governance involving representative institutions , 
the trading companies also spread those ideas into new political venues. 
Of particular importance for an American law review article, it is worth 
recalling the discussion earlier of the role of the Massachusett s Bay and 
Virginia companies in transplanting a board governance model into co-
lonial political institutions. 408 
It is also possible to recognize the importance of the political le-
gitimacy provided by the corporate board of directors when one consid-
ers the nineteenth century history of American corporate law. One of the 
common themes of this history is the concern of state governments and 
political leaders about the power of corporations. 409 For example, in con-
trast to worrying about undercapitalized corporations, New York's pio-
neering general incorporation law limited the maximum amount of capi-
tal corporations could raise to $100,000. 410 Image in this light, the 
reaction of legislatures asked to enact general incorporation statutes had 
the governance model for such entities explicitl y provided that un-
405. See supra text accompany ing notes 195-207 . 
406 . See supra text accompanying notes 367 -68. 
407 . See supra text accompany ing notes 255 , 259. 
408. See supra text accompa nying notes 117-18. 
409 . See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-56 (1933) (Brandeis , J. dissenting) ; 
LAWR ENCE FRIEDMAN, A HI STORY OF AMERI CAN L AW 188-99 (2d ed. 1985). 
4 10. liggell Co., 288 U.S. at 55 1 (Brandeis , J. dissenting). 
172 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW (Vol. 33:89 
elected, unaccountable, managers would have control over this economic 
power.411 
In an era, like the present, in which it is popular to talk of the cor-
poration as nothing more than a "nexus of contracts,',412 commentators 
might dismiss a role for the board in providing political legitimacy, as 
mistakenly treating corporations like little "republic[s)." 413 Yet, to dis-
miss the goal of political legitimacy is to ignore the history of the corpo-
ration and of the board of directors. The question thus becomes: Have 
attitudes toward corporations and corporate boards so changed that the 
goal of political legitimacy is no longer relevant. If so, then one might 
conclude that the corporate board of directors is a largely useless, if 
mostly harmless, institution carried on out of inertia (in other words, the 
corporate equivalent of tonsils). Indeed, the original draft of this Article, 
presented at a corporate law roundtable jointly sponsored by U.C.L.A. 
and the University of Southern California, suggested this conclusion. 
Yet, in presenting the paper at the roundtable, I found myself viscerally 
uncomfortable with this position. In asking myself why, I realized that it 
is because I am a product of a culture which includes, among its values, 
the ideas of consent and representation that arose in medieval European 
political institutions and are still reflected in the corporate board of di-
rectors today. I confess that, as a shareholder, I practice rational apathy 
and trash proxy statements. Yet, I favor proposals ( even broader than 
those recently floated by the Securities Exchange Commission414 ) to re-
quire corporate proxies to include the name of director candidates nomi-
nated by shareholders-not because I expect any improvement in corpo-
rate performance, but because this is more consistent with democratic 
ideals.415 What this suggests is that the reason the board of directors en-
dures is because human beings, even in the business context, do not di-
vorce their notions of how to run a business from their broader political 
411. I must thank my research assistant, Thomas Clark, who had been a professor of American 
history before deciding to come to law school, for raising the question of whether the legitimating 
function of the corporate board might have been particularly important during the move to general 
incorporation acts. 
412. Eugene F. Fama , Agency Problems and the TheotJ' of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290 
(1980); see also William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Con-
straints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982). 
413. Henry G. Manne, Citizen Donaldson, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2003, at AIO. 
414. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Proposed Rule Release No. 34-48626, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 60784 (Oct. 23, 2003). 
415. Admittedly, the ideas of representation utilized in medieval political institutions are not 
consistent with current notions of representative democracy. This simply shows how the norm of 
political legitimacy through representative governing institutions becomes measured against evolv-
ing ideas of representation. 
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and cultural ideas,416 and that the idea of consent through elected repre-
sentatives is so ingrained in our culture that shareholders expect it even 
if they do not take advantage of it. 
416. For a recent attempt to document statistically the relationship between cultural va lues and 
business governance, see Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-
C11/t11ra/ Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (200 I). 
